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Gambling has been experimentally investigated using various types of gambling
simulations designed to mimic the contingencies found in real-world games of chance.
Findings from past risky choice research suggest that certain procedures used in existing
gambling simulations may systematically increase levels of gambling. Two of these
characteristics, the use of a participant stake and the type of options available during
gambling, were tested in four experiments in which participants had the opportunity to
gamble using tokens exchangeable for entries into a $50 lottery. Experiments 1 and 2
tested persistence on a gamble option when either a single-option or a concurrent
gamble no-gamble option was available. In Experiment 1, during concurrent conditions
choice of the gamble option probabilistically produced tokens and choice of the nogamble option progressed the game to the next trial. Gambling levels were similarly
high in both the gamble and no-gamble options. In Experiment 2, the no-gamble option
also produced tokens, i.e., token production, and gambling greatly decreased when
token production was concurrently available with gambling. In Experiment 3, a
concurrent gamble token-production procedure was used to test preference for a
gamble option when participants were or were not staked with tokens prior to a

session. Under no-stake conditions, participants could only gamble with tokens earned
by choosing the no-gamble option. Choices of the gambling option per choice
opportunity were higher under stake than no-stake conditions, but only on the first
exposure to the task. Experiment 4 investigated the effects of the value of the tokenproduction option on gambling levels and showed that gambling levels were low
regardless of condition. Together, the findings from these experiments suggested that
existing gambling procedures that have only a single-gamble option or on which an
initial participant stake is given might generate higher levels of gambling compared to
when a concurrent token-production option is also available or when participants are
not given an initial stake. These findings suggest that common features of laboratorygambling tasks may elevate risk taking and that a concurrent gamble token-production
procedure may therefore be a more useful procedure for investigating gambling.
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INTRODUCTION
Humans often choose among options that produce unpredictable outcomes and
a considerable amount of psychological and economic research has therefore been
directed towards understanding decision making in situations involving uncertainty and
risk. Historically, human decision-making has been studied in the laboratory using tasks
that arrange risky choices. Risky-choice tasks that involve gambling have been a favored
method for studying risky choice primarily because unpredictable monetary outcomes
can be easily arranged in laboratory settings, and because gambling is viewed as a valid
model of choice under uncertainty (see Kahneman & Tyversky, 1984). More recently,
however, gambling has begun to receive considerable attention among researchers and
clinicians as a behavior of interest in its own right. This growing interest in gambling may
be attributed in part to the increasing availability of legalized gambling worldwide and
to the fact that a majority of adults (86%) report to they have gambled in their lifetime
(see National Gambling Impact Study Commission [NGISC] final report, 1999).
The increased interest in gambling research may also be attributed to the
negative impact that gambling can have on human health and welfare. One peculiar
characteristic of gambling is that gambling often persists despite producing a net loss of
reinforcement (i.e., in most cases, the reinforcer is money; see Skinner, 1953). Thus,
excessive gambling has the propensity to produce financial hardship for a gambler,
especially when wagering exceeds a person's assets (i.e., wagering borrowed money). In
addition, a small proportion (1-3%) of people who gamble develop a compulsive pattern
of responding called pathological gambling (see APA DSM-IV, 1994; Beaudoin & Cox,
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1999; Loba, Stewart, Klein, & Blackburn, 2001; Volberg, 1994). This disorder is
characterized by gambling beyond one's means, committing illegal acts in order to
continue gambling, and viewing gambling as a legitimate way to recoup previous losses.
In general, these individuals tend to experience occupational, family, or health-related
problems, in addition to monetary losses due to their gambling behavior (Petry &
Armentano, 1999).
Although the etiology of pathological gambling remains unclear, most evidence
has suggested a strong relationship between the availability of legalized gambling and
both the amount of gambling and the prevalence of pathological gambling symptoms in
the surrounding population (Abbott & Volberg, 2000; Room, Turner, & lalomiteanu,
1999; Sevigny, Ladouceur, Jacques, & Cantinotti, 2008). Not unlike other countries, the
United States (U.S.) has recently experienced a rapid growth in gambling availability (see
below), which suggests a growing need for research directed at understanding the
factors that generate and maintain gambling in both pathological and non-pathological
populations (see Petry & Armentano, 1999). One problem has been that most research
on risky choice that has purportedly studied gambling behavior has not been designed
to inform the analysis of gambling perse. That is, although choice under uncertainty has
generated considerable research, risky-choice studies described as investigations of
gambling are typically designed to analyze variables that influence decision making
under uncertainty more broadly. For instance, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) noted:
Risky choices, such as whether or not to take an umbrella and whether or not to
go to war, are made without advance knowledge of their consequences. Because
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the consequences of such actions depend on uncertain events such as the
weather or the opponent's resolve, the choice of an act may be construed as the
acceptance of a gamble that can yield various outcomes with different
probabilities, (p. 341)
Because the majority of risky-choice research has not been designed to address
gambling specifically, most laboratory risky-choice procedures fail to replicate the
contingencies arranged in natural gambling environments (e.g., those found in casinos).
As a result, the extent to which the findings from this research generalize to an analysis
of gambling on games of chance remains unclear.
Recently, operant psychologists have made clear advances in the degree to
which laboratory procedures mimic naturalistic gambling contingencies by developing
simulated games of chance based on games typically found in the natural environment
(see MacLin & Dixon, 2004). These procedures offer many advantages over typical risky
decision-making procedures, which often use verbally-presented gambles with
hypothetical outcomes and measure choice during brief assessments (often on a single
trial). Conversely, simulated-gambling procedures typically give participants repeated
opportunities to gamble on one or more gamble options, thereby allowing performance
to be influenced by the experienced contingencies rather than by the verbal
descriptions of the gamble. Simulated-gambling procedures therefore expose
participants to gambling contingencies that more closely mimic those found in natural
gambling environments, and as a result, performance on these procedures are likely to
have greater ecological validity than performance obtained from other methods.
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Although simulated-gambling procedures have many advantages over typical
risky-choice procedures, the contingencies they arrange still differ from those found in
gambling contexts outside the laboratory (see below). It is uncertain whether those
differences significantly affect the likelihood of gambling, thus, the primary goals of the
present research were to: (a) evaluate the effects on gambling of several common
features of simulated-gambling procedures and (b) develop and test a new procedure
that was designed to better model real-world gambling contingencies. In the following
sections, common methods of studying gambling are critically reviewed and a new
simulated-gambling procedure is described. First, however, a brief historical overview of
gambling and gambling-related problems are discussed in order to highlight the growing
need to study gambling.
Historical Overview
Gambling has played a role in human cultures throughout the world for several
millennia (see France, 1902). Interestingly, evidence from the historical record shows
that the negative consequences of gambling, especially the financial and personal
hardships that sometimes result from excessive gambling, have been well known since
ancient times (see Aristophanes, 423 B.C.E.; Juvenal, circa 100; Steinmetz, 1870).
Despite these problems, gambling has remained a viable business opportunity and
source of entertainment in many parts of the world throughout much of recorded
history. Of course, its availability has also been met with considerable opposition as
well, for instance, legalized gambling in the United States (U.S.) has experienced several
eras of legalization and prohibition since the early American colonies.
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The most recent era of legalization in the U.S. started in the early 1930's as an
effort to boost state revenue following the economic crisis that followed the 1929 stockmarket crash (Thompson, 1997). A much larger wave of legalized gaming followed the
recommendations made by the 1976 Commission on the Review of the National Policy
Toward Gambling (CRNPTG; 1976). This commission, established by the U.S. federal
government, suggested that legalized-gaming legislation should be a state rather than a
federal government responsibility. As a result, all but two states (Utah and Hawaii) now
allow some type of gaming, including casinos, pari-mutuel wagering, charitable gaming,
and lotteries.
The expansion of both private-equity and state-sponsored gaming in the U.S.
occurred despite warnings from the 1976 CRNPTG about the negative social and
economic impacts of widespread gaming. For example, members of the commission
cited evidence of the problematic relationship that existed between gaming availability
and the prevalence of gambling-related problems, including pathological gambling.
Although relatively little data were available on pathological gambling when the
commission issued its report, their warnings were confirmed by subsequent research.
For instance, a significant correlation between gaming availability and the prevalence of
pathological gambling in a given area is now well-established (Abbott & Volberg, 2000;
Room et al., 1999). Furthermore, the prevalence of pathological gambling appears to be
increasing across many demographic groups, and the rates of bankruptcy and
unemployment are significantly higher among pathological gamblers than non-gamblers
(NGISC, 1999).
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These trends are especially troubling given that the availability of legalized
gaming continues to increase. Following the expansion of legalized gaming in the U.S.,
the total revenue of the gaming industry (based on earnings from all gaming sources)
has grown at a compound annual rate of over 9%, from $10.4 billion in 1982 to over
$90.9 billion in 2006 (American Gaming Association, 2008; NGISC, 1999). Interestingly,
an increase in gaming availability is also occurring worldwide, for example, according to
the New York Times (Barboza, 2007) and Reuters (Leung, 2009), as of 2006 China's
gaming center in Macao had greater gaming revenues than Las Vegas and recently
experienced annual revenue growth that exceeded 20%. The professional-services firm
PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated in 2009 that gaming revenues worldwide would
continue to steadily grow to an estimated annual revenue of $155 billion by 2012
(revenues were $114 billion in 2007).
Several factors are likely to contribute to the continued expansion of legalized
gaming in the U.S. and other countries. First, as indicated by survey data collected by
the NGISC (1999), a large proportion of the population enjoys gambling and therefore its
continued availability is likely to receive strong social support in many areas. Second,
the gaming industry has produced economic benefits that are unparalleled by most
other industries, including employment opportunities, business taxes, payroll taxes, and
other taxes paid directly to state and local governments (see the American Gaming
Association, 2008, for an industry sponsored review). If the availability of gaming
continues to increase, however, there will likely be a corresponding increase in
gambling-related problems, including pathological gambling. These, as well as other
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consequences of increased gaming availability have been extremely difficult to quantify
economically, thus, the true economic benefits of legalized gambling remains unclear.
Nevertheless, there is a growing need to investigate the variables that influence
gambling. Moreover, it is important that studies of gambling produce findings that
extend outside the laboratory into the natural gambling environment. One way to
improve the generality of gambling research is to develop laboratory-gambling
procedures that closely model those environments.
METHODS FOR STUDYING UNCERTAINTY: HUMAN DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH
Definitions of Gambling and Risky Choice
Before discussing methods that have been used for studying gambling, it will be
useful to define several terms commonly used in the analysis of gambling and riskydecision making. The behavior of "gambling" may be defined as a decision to make a
wager, i.e., an investment of a reinforcer (usually money), in exchange for the
opportunity to probabilistically gain a reinforcer of greater value (see McGlothlin, 1956).
Although a gamble involves choice under uncertainty, it may be distinguished from
other types of risk taking by the fact that a gamble requires an initial wager (i.e.,
response cost) and therefore it always has the potential to produce a loss for the
gambler. Although other types of risks may also involve negative outcomes, the initial
wager of a commodity is unique to a gamble. Hereafter, an option that produces
uncertain outcomes is described as a gamble if it requires a wager and as a risk if it does
not.
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The distinction between a gamble and a risk is important because gambles and
risks differ in how the contingencies are quantified. Because a gamble requires an initial
wager and a risk does not, the net value of a win (i.e., a reinforcer) produced by a
gamble must always incorporate the wager value. For example, if a gamble requires a $3
wager to play and produces a win of $10, then the gambler experiences a net gain of $7,
whereas if a risk produces a win of $10, then the gambler experiences a net gain of $10.
The outcome value of a risk is typically quantified using mathematical expected
value (EV) (see Edwards, 1955):
EV =

X(p*A)

where, for all possible outcomes, p is the probability of a particular outcome with a net
value A. A simple example of a risk is illustrated by a game in which rolling a "6" on one
roll of a six-sided die produces $12 and all other outcomes produce $0. This risk has an
expected value of $2:
E \ / = [ ( l / 6 ) * 1 2 ] + [(5/6)*0] = 2
Across many plays of the risk, then, an average gain of $2 per risk would be expected.
The EVior a gamble can also be calculated. For example, if the previous risk
required a $1 wager in order to play, the expected value of the gamble would be $1.
E V = [ { l / 6 ) * l l ] + [(5/6)*-l] = l
Of course, the EV of any risk or gamble may be very different from the obtained value
(the net loss or gain of reinforcers that results from playing the risk of gamble),
however, the expected value and obtained values tend to converge as the number of
plays increases.
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Because a gamble always involves an initial wager (investment) by the gambler,
its value can also be expressed as a return on investment. The mean amount returned
by a gamble, or rate of return, is calculated as the proportion of the wager. This quantity
has also been called the gamble's percentage payback {PP) and is calculated as:

( ^P*Ar ) *\1 0 0 %
R

where Aw is the wager value and AR is the value returned (i.e., A + Aw). From the
previous $1 gamble, the PP is 200%:

PP = [ A/6* 12 \

+

/5/6*0\ j * 100o/o =

200o/o

Notice that gambles with a negative EV will always have a PP less than 100%, and
gambles with a positive Ft/will always have a PP greater than 100%. Casino games, for
instance, always have a PP less than 100%.
Unlike EV, PP expresses gains as a proportion of the amount wagered. This
characteristic is illustrated in the previous gamble which was expected to produce a $1
net gain, or a 200% return on investment, for each $1 wager (i.e., the gambler would
expect to get $2 back for every $1 wagered on average). Nevertheless, these two
calculations express the same information for a gamble and either value can be
converted to the other using the following calculations:

PP = lEXl^i\*

100%

EV=[PP*AyJ\.Avj
\ 100% /
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It is impossible to convert between EVand PP for a risk because PP is undefined when
the wager is zero.
General Methods
As noted above, decision-making research has used gambling as a model for
understanding human decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. Although the
procedures used in these studies have varied greatly, they typically involved singledecision procedures in which a choice among a pair of options was presented once to
participants in a discrete-trial format (e.g., Preston & Baratta, 1948; Thaler & Johnson,
1990; Tversky, 1967). Thus, in single-decision procedures, participants are often given
only a single opportunity to make their choice for a particular risk or gamble, and a
different risk or gamble is presented on each subsequent trial. The risk or gamble is
described verbally to the participant and included information about the wager value,
probability of winning or losing, and the outcome values. Participants generally indicate
their choice verbally to the experimenter.
Although some decision-making studies using single-decision procedures have
used real monetary outcomes, most have used hypothetical outcomes (for a review, see
Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004). For example, in a study by Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
after a participant indicated his or her choice among the risky options no game was
played and no outcomes were actually delivered. Rather, the experimenter simply
presented the next option. Part of the rationale for using hypothetical outcomes was
that it allowed experimenters to assess risky choice for monetary amounts that were
much larger than those which could feasibly be paid during an experiment. Kahneman
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and Tversky argued that the use of large, hypothetical outcomes produced a more valid
assessment of performance than small, real outcomes because the outcomes were
more representative of those risked in the real world.
Various measures have been used to quantify human decision-making in the
laboratory. Some of these include: a) self-reported judgments of the attractiveness of a
risk or gamble (e.g., a purchase or wager value) (Preston & Baratta, 1948; Lindman,
1971; Slovic, 1969b; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968a; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968b), b)
preferences among options of a risk or gamble (Coombs & Pruitt 1960; Edwards, 1953;
Edwards, 1954; Lindman, 1971; Miller, Meyer, & Lanzetta, 1969; Slovic, 1969a), and c)
decisions to play or not (i.e., pass) on each trial (Mosteller & Nogee, 1951). Each of
these measures has been used to test the effects of uncertainty on responding, yet
different performances have been found depending on the measure that was used
(Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Lindman, 1971; Mellers, Chang, Birnbaum, & Ordonez,
1992; Slovic, 1972; Tversky, Slovic, & Kahneman, 1990). This inconsistency, which is
often referred to as preference reversal, has been shown to be a reliable finding
especially among choice and attractiveness measures. In general, it is believed that
differences in how a risk or gamble is presented to a participant directly influence how
the outcome probabilities and values influence behavior (Tversky et al.).
Cognitive Models of Decision-Making
Most research on risky choice has been conducted by cognitive psychologists
using the single-decision procedures described above. This research has revealed
several important findings about human risk preferences, and various cognitive
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decision-making models were developed to describe the results. Some of the most
influential models are summarized below.
Expected-value maximization. Since the 18th century, expected value has been
used to objectively quantify the value of a gamble (see Bernoulli, 1738/1954; Edwards
1955; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Kriieger, Daston, & Heidelberger, 1987). A common
assumption has been individuals should prefer gambles that maximize expected value, a
prediction known as expected-value maximization, (see Bernoulli, 1738/1954). This
assumption is appealing because it assumes that decision-making is rational and
predictable. That is, if behavior showed EV maximization then it should be solely
determined by the outcome probability and size of the available options.
Since the first systematic investigations of the effects of outcome probability and
size on preference for a gamble, however, it was clear that performance differed from
EV maximization (Mosteller & Nogee, 1951; Preston & Baratta, 1948). Daniel Bernoulli
(1738/1954) was one of the first to suggest that preferences that differed from those
predicted by EV maximization probably served an adaptive function and were therefore
not indicative of irrationality. Bernoulli supported his claim using an example known as
the Saint Petersburg Paradox (first described by his cousin, Nicolas Bernoulli, in
Montmort, 1713). The Saint Petersburg Paradox is a hypothetical gambling scenario in
which a gambler is asked to report what they would be willing to pay for a gamble with
the following conditions: a) each consecutive toss of a fair coin will result in either the
end of the game, if heads lands up, or another coin toss, if tails lands up, b) and when
heads lands up (and the game is ended) the gambler will be paid the amount of $2f
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where t equals the number of consecutive tails-up coin tosses that occurred prior to the
last heads-up toss. Because the decreased likelihood of sequential tails-up tosses across
trials is matched by a proportional increase in the outcome value, each subsequent toss
has a constant and positive EV. Because the possible number of consecutive tails-up
tosses is infinite, the EV of this gamble is positive infinity. According to EV maximization,
then, no wager value should be too high of a price to pay in order to play the gamble.
Yet, Bernoulli concluded that no rational person would risk much of his or her total
wealth to play the gamble.
This thought experiment demonstrated a limitation of EV maximization as a
robust model of decision-making. Many subsequent experiments have confirmed that
indeed risky choice is often inconsistent with predictions based on EV (e.g., Edwards,
1953; Preston & Baratta, 1948). Although Bernoulli and others effectively argued that EV
maximization might not be a good predictor of human choice, researchers continue to
describe preference among risks and gambles in relation to EV because it provides an
objective standard against which preference can be compared.
Subjective expected value. Because EV maximization failed to provide an
adequate description of human decision-making, several subsequent models of risky
decision-making were developed in which the objective parameters of the EV model
(amount and probability) were replaced with their subjective form. That is, in these
models one or both of the objective EV parameters, outcome probability and size, were
substituted with a subjective value, subjective probability and utility, respectively.
Unlike outcome probability and size, which were based on objective characteristics of
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the risk or gamble, subjective probability and utility were derived from participants'
performance and were intended to indicate the subjective probability and size values on
which their decision-making was based.
Preston and Baratta (1948) developed one of the first alternatives to EV
maximization. These researchers assessed participants' bids for 42 unique gambles and
found that bid prices increased systematically with increased win size. However,
participants usually paid too much for low probability gambles (p = 0.05 or less) and too
little for higher probability gambles (p = 0.25 or greater). The authors suggested that
bidding was not influenced by the gamble's stated probability, but instead was
influenced by participants' subjective probability, a value that reflected a participant's
estimate of the outcome probability. When objective probability in the EV model is
replaced with this subjective value, the result is the subjective expected value [SEV)
model:
SEV =

I(ps*A)

where ps is subjective probability. The SEV model had considerable appeal, as it was
able to account for many deviations from rational responding (i.e., EV maximization).
Expected utility. Another alternative to EV maximization resulted from studies
that also showed decision-making was sensitive to the outcome size of a gamble, but
not in the linear fashion predicted by EV maximization (see Bernoulli, 1738/1954;
Mosteller & Nogee, 1951). Instead, it was often observed that small gains tended to be
overvalued whereas large gains tended to be undervalued (see utility curves below). It
was concluded that participants' irrational performance was a result of the difference
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between the actual commodity values used and their subjective value, or the utility of
that commodity to the participant. In other words, utility was what a commodity was
worth to a particular person, and therefore it did not necessarily match the objective
value of the commodity (e.g., its actual monetary value). The expected utility (EU) of an
uncertain outcome was described as:
EU = I (p * u)
where u is utility. Similar to the SEV model, the EU model was appealing because it
maintained a rational view of human decision-making. That is, if behavior failed to
maximize £Vit was because behavior maximized EU.
Subjective expected utility. Both the SEV and EU models assumed that a process
of subjective valuation occurs prior to decision-making, however, the subjective value
used in each model was an objective value in the other, i.e., one model assumed that
only probability was subjectively evaluated whereas the other assumed that only the
commodity value was subjectively evaluated. According to Edwards (1953):
The situation is one in which one event (a choice) is determined by the
interaction of two unknowns, probability and value as the S [subject] sees them.
It is obviously unreasonable to use either of the unknowns unless we know the
value of the other unknown or can assume that it has been held constant, (pp.
363-364)
Because research had shown that both subjective probability and utility deviated
systematically from their objective counterparts, several researchers argued that both
outcome probability and size were subjectively evaluated during decision making
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(Edwards, 1954; Savage 1954; Siegel, 1959). The result was an integrated model of
subjective probability and utility, called the subjective expected utility (SEU) model:
SEU = I (ps * u)
From the 1950s to the 1970s, the SEU model dominated the analysis of decisionmaking behavior (e.g., Coombs & Komorita, 1958; Coombs & Pruitt, 1960; Lindman,
1971; Miller et al., 1969; Royden, Suppes, & Walsh, 1959; Slovic, 1969a; Slovic, 1969b;
Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968a; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968b; Tversky, 1967). Although the
SEU model provided an accurate description of choice in many contexts, it did not allow
predictions be made a priori (i.e., subjective weights must be determined from
performance) and it was unable to account for several important patterns of risk
preference, described below.
Prospect theory. One unexpected finding from risky choice research was that
choice tended to be risk aversive when options were gains but risk prone when options
were losses (Kahenman & Tversky, 1979). The SEU model was unable to account for this
pattern. An alternative model called Prospect Theory, was therefore proposed
(Kahenman & Tversky, 1979). Prospect Theory was able to account for the shifts in risky
choice across gains and losses and other choice patterns for which the SEU model had
difficulty. These accomplishments were generally the result of adding several subjective
and hypothetical elements to the SEU model (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). According to Prospect Theory, numerous genetically
endowed heuristics are employed during decision making that subjectively value each
option for that person, at that time, in their current environment (for discussion on
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heuristics and their possible neural mechanisms, see Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005;
Trepel, Fox, & Poldrack, 2005). After all options under consideration are subjectively
valuated according to these heuristics, the person selects the one with the greatest
expected value. Several of the most significant tenets of this approach can be illustrated
with two sets of hypothetical choice problems (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 268). In
each set, participants were asked to choose an option consisting of an outcome
probability (if none is given, p = 1) and size from each of two paired options. The
obtained proportion of responses for each option is shown in brackets:

Setl:
A: $4000, 0.80 [20]

or

B: $3000 [80]

C: $4000, 0.20 [65]

or

D: $3000, 0.25 [35]

Set 2:
A': -$4000, 0.80 [92]

or

B': -$3000 [8]

C: -$4000, 0.20 [42]

or

D': -$3000, 0.25 [58]

It should be clear that Sets 1 and 2 contained identical options, except that in Set A
outcomes were expressed as gains and in Set B they were expressed as losses,
respectively. Within each set, the outcome values were the same from the first (A-B and
A'-B') to the second (C-D and C'-D') pair, however, the probabilities in the second pair
were exactly one fourth the probability as in the first pair, therefore expected value in
the second pair was one-fourth the expected value as in the first pair.
In Set 1, when presented with a choice between options with certain or
probabilistic gains (A-B) or two options with probabilistic gains (C-D), participants
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showed a strong preference for the low-value, certain gain relative to the high-value,
probabilistic gain in A-B, but preferred the high-value gain when both outcomes were
similarly uncertain in C-D. The reverse pattern was observed when the same options
were expressed as losses in Set 2. That is, participants preferred the high value
probabilistic loss relative to the certain loss in A'-B', but preferred the low value loss
when both outcomes were similarly uncertain in C'-D'.
The authors suggested that the responses on both Sets 1 and 2 indicated that
participants tended to overweight options that produced certain rather than
probabilistic outcomes (called the certainty effect). As such, it is likely that small changes
in probability away from certainty (p = 0 or 1) have a greater impact than larger changes
at probability values further away from certainty (e.g., 0.2 to 0.8). The systematic
reversal in preferences among Sets 1 and 2 demonstrated another central tenet of
Prospect Theory, that preference among options that produce gains is opposite of
preference among the same options presented as losses (called the framing effect).
Specifically, preference among gains is risk averse and preference among losses is risk
prone. Risk aversion is a preference for the option with the greatest probability whereas
risk proneness is a preference for the option with the lowest probability. Therefore,
when the options that produced risk-averse preference in A-B were changed to produce
negative outcomes in A'-B', preference was risk prone. This pattern in preference was a
primary factor that led to the rejection of the SEU model, which predicted risk aversion
in all instances (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

18

Prospect Theory, and its modified form Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992, for a review contrasting these models, see, Fennema & Wakker,
1997), like SEU, cannot be used to make a priori predictions about risk preferences.
Nevertheless, it makes several unique predictions about behavior and appears to
account for many violations of rationality. It therefore remains a leading model of risk
sensitivity.
Methodological Limitations of Decision-Making Research for the Analysis of Gambling
As discussed above, the most common procedure for studying risk sensitivity in
humans has been to present participants with single-decision tasks, using hypothetical,
verbally-presented options. Although these procedures may model many one-shot risky
decisions that occur in everyday life and have led to the development of several
important accounts of risk sensitivity, including Prospect Theory, the many differences
between these procedures and contingencies arranged by games of chance may limit
the generalizability of the results to gambling.
Hypothetical commodities. Although both real and hypothetical commodities
have been used in decision-making research, most studies have used the latter (see
Weber et al., 2004). When hypothetical commodities are used, participants were
typically instructed to respond as if the options produced real commodities (e.g.,
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). The use of hypothetical commodities was encouraged by
decision researchers, including Kahneman and Tversky. As described above, these
authors suggested that using hypothetical, rather than real commodities was the most
informative approach to studying decision making because it allowed researchers to
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study choice for large, albeit hypothetical, outcome values. They also rejected the
notion that using hypothetical commodities created any unique problems:
The reliance on hypothetical choices raises obvious questions regarding
the validity of the method and the generalizability of the results. We are keenly
aware of these problems. However, all other methods that have been used to
test utility theory also suffer from severe drawbacks....Laboratory experiments
have been designed to obtain precise measures of utility and probability from
actual choices, but these experimental studies typically involve contrived
gambles for small stakes, and a large number of repetitions of very similar
problems. These features of laboratory gambling complicate the interpretation
of the results and restrict their generality.
By default, the method of hypothetical choices emerges as the simplest
procedure by which a large number of theoretical questions can be investigated.
The use of the method relies on the assumption that people know how they
would behave in actual situations of choice, and on the further assumption that
the subjects have no special reason to disguise their true preferences, (p. 265)
Contrary to this argument, however, research has shown that performance
sometimes differs depending on whether real or hypothetical outcomes were used
(Weber et al., 2004), although this effect is somewhat inconsistent and depends on a
number of other variables such as the type of procedures used to assess performance
(Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). Overall, however, a main finding is that behavior tends to
be more risk averse when outcomes are real compared to when outcomes are
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hypothetical. This effect has been shown across studies in which both gains and losses
have been investigated (Weber et al., 2004). Thus, studies that use hypothetical
outcomes may not generalize to gambling in natural environments where outcomes are
real money.
Single-trial experimental tasks. In many decision-making experiments,
participants are given only single-trial exposures to gambles in order to assess
performance. In gambling opportunities outside the laboratory, however, individuals are
given repeated experience with the same gamble. Thus, the generality of data from
single-trial studies to gambling may be limited. A likely reason for the use of single-trial
procedures in decision research is that cognitive models, such as Prospect Theory,
describe preference in terms of cognitive mechanisms rather than in terms of behaviorenvironment contingencies. Because it is assumed that mechanisms such as the
certainty and framing effects are genetic traits (for a review, see Trepel et al., 2005), it is
presumed that those processes will result in a similar decision on the first trial with a
particular gamble as on subsequent exposures. Because choice is assessed on only a
single trial, however, responding in these studies cannot be attributed to experience
with a particular gamble, but only to pre-experimental experiences with similar options
or to experiences with different gambles earlier in the experimental session.
What is particularly problematic for extending these studies to an analysis of
gambling is that risk has been shown to vary systematically with experience on a
particular risk or gamble. That is, risk preferences differ when options are presented
only once compared to when they are presented repeatedly (Barron & Erev, 2003; Haw,
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2007; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hertwig & Oilman, 2001; Hogarth, 1981;
Keren & Wagenaar, 1987; Ladouceur, Mayrand, & Touringy, 1987; Lopes, 1981; Rachlin,
1990; Weber et al., 2004; Wedell & Bockenholt, 1990). Keren and Wagenaar, for
example, showed that preference for a gamble option on a single-decision procedure
was modeled well by Prospect Theory (i.e., choice for gains was risk averse). However,
when 10 consecutive choices on the same gamble were made, choice was more risk
prone. One possible explanation for this effect is that the outcome experienced on each
trial influenced choice on subsequent trials, which is not possible when choice is
assessed on only a single trial. These results suggest that performance on single-decision
procedures may not readily generalize to gambling in the natural environment because
games are played repeatedly and performance on games of chance is likely influenced
by the consequences of previous choices (i.e., few people sit down to play slot
machines, blackjack, craps, etc. and only play a single trial, see Rachlin, 1990).
Summary
Research by experimental psychologists on human decision-making in situations
of risk has provided important information about the relationship between behavior
and uncertain events. The most common method of studying risk sensitivity has been to
present participants with single choices between verbally-described hypothetical risks or
gambles. Several normative models of choice have been developed using these
procedures, and each has assumed that human choice is fundamentally rational. The
failure of several models related to EV maximization led to the development of Prospect
Theory, which remains a leading model of risk sensitivity among psychologists because it
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makes several unique predictions about behavior and accounts for many violations of
rationality. Although the single-trial methods used by experimental psychologists are
valuable for understanding single choices in situations involving risk, the findings of
these studies may not generalize well to gambling.
METHODS FOR STUDYING UNCERTAINTY: REINFORCEMENT-SCHEDULE RESEARCH
General Methods
Similar to economists and cognitive psychologists interested in risk, behavior
analysts have also studied the effects of uncertainty on behavior by analyzing
preference among options with varying probabilities and amounts (see Herrnstein,
1990a, 1990b). However, major differences in assumptions about the proper subject
matter of psychology and causes of action have led behavior analysts to study risk using
different procedures and to develop different interpretations of how variability affects
responding. Behavior analysts, for example, assume that environmental contingencies,
particularly the consequences of action, are the primary variables controlling behavior
(Skinner, 1953). Thus, the behavior-analytic research methodology is characterized by
repeated exposure to contingencies and repeated observations of behavior, and the use
of real rather than hypothetical consequences. Researchers usually investigate
responding by a small number of subjects over long periods of extended exposure to
experimental conditions, often until behavioral stability is achieved (Cumming &
Schoenfeld, 1960). Behavior is repeatedly measured under a particular set of conditions
because responding often changes over time, especially following initial exposure to a
particular contingency (Ferster & Skinner, 1957).
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Reinforcement schedules. Early experimental analyses of behavior sought to
determine how the schedule of reinforcement influenced responding (see Ferster &
Skinner, 1957). Schedules of reinforcement define the set of requirements that relate
reinforcer delivery to responding, the passage of time, or both. For example, ratio
schedules define the quantity of responding that the subject must emit in order for a
reinforcer delivery to occur. Alternatively, time schedules require only that a certain
period elapse prior to reinforcer delivery. Interval schedules specify that responding will
only produce a reinforcer if a response occurs after a certain period of elapsed time.
Schedules for reinforcer delivery can be arranged such that the response or interval
requirements are fixed (e.g., Ferster & Skinner, 1957), variable (e.g., Ferster & Skinner,
1957), random (e.g., Millenson, 1963; Sidley & Schoenfeld, 1964), progressive (e.g.,
Hodos & Kalman, 1963), et cetera. Research has shown that the schedule type and
requirement directly influence the rate and patterns of responding (Ferster & Skinner,
1957).
Operant psychologists first investigated the effects of uncertainty on behavior by
examining performance on variable schedules of reinforcement and comparing it to
performance on fixed schedules. With fixed schedules, such as fixed-ratio (FR) or fixedinterval (Fl) schedules, a constant number of unreinforced responses or a constant
period of non-reinforcement, respectively, follows each reinforcer. Alternatively, with
variable schedules, such as such as variable-ratio (VR) or variable-interval (VI) schedules,
a variable number of unreinforced responses or a variable period of non-reinforcement,
respectively, follows each reinforcer (see also constant-probability VI schedules, Catania
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& Reynolds, 1968; Fleschler & Hoffman, 1962). A main finding of this research was that
variable schedules (both VI and VR schedules) produce higher rates of responding than
fixed schedules (see Catania & Reynolds, 1968; Farmer, 1963).
Catania and Reynolds (1968), for example, showed that when pigeons keypecked for grain access, Fl schedules tended to produce far lower response rates than
comparable VI schedules. This finding, the authors speculated, was a result of the
predictable nature of reinforcer delivery generated on the Fl schedule. That is, the
subjects eventually learned that reinforcement never occurred immediately following a
reinforcer delivery, and thus responding after reinforcement was very low. The low
rates of responding after reinforcement was described as a post-reinforcement pause
(also called inter-reinforcement interval pause, Mazur, 1983). Catania and Reynolds
noted:
The Fl schedule includes discriminable periods of time during which the local
rates of reinforcement, as inferred from performance, is or at near zero.... Such
performance, which results in a large proportion of time when low rates of
responding occur during each interval, produces an overall rate of pecking lower
than that maintained by a schedule that provides no discriminable periods of
nonreinforcement [the VI schedule], (p. 369)
Other studiers have shown a similar effect using intermittent ratio schedules. That is, VR
schedules tend to generate higher rates of continuous responding compared to FR
schedules (Ahearn & Hineline, 1992; Field, Tonneau, Ahearn, & Hineline, 1996). This
effect may be partially due to the post-reinforcement pausing that occurs on FR
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schedules (Felton & Lyon, 1966; Powell, 1968). The cyclical periods of low response
rates following reinforcement on both Fl and FR schedules are likely a result of the
predictable nature of the schedule requirements. However, some studies have also
shown that VR schedules maintain higher rates of responding (and generate greater
preference) because some reinforcers are produced with very short delays to
reinforcement (i.e., since the previous reinforcer) compared to those delays produced
on an FR schedule with an equal mean rate of reinforcement (Field et al., 1996) (see
below).
Researchers have also investigated the effects of uncertainty on behavior using
random schedules. Random schedules differ from variable schedules in that reinforcer
delivery is determined probabilistically. For instance, reinforcer delivery on a randomtime (RT) schedule is accomplished by repeatedly sampling a random number generator
at regular intervals. A similar procedure is used for response-contingent random
schedules, such as random-ratio (RR) and random-interval (Rl) schedules in which the
probability of reinforcement is determined probabilistically after each response or after
fixed time intervals, respectively. Random schedules tend to generate similar or slightly
higher response rates than equivalent variable schedules, and like VI or VR schedules
they generate much higher rates than fixed schedules (e.g., Madden, Dake, Mauel, &
Rowe, 2005).
Reinforcement-schedule research has therefore indicated that variability in
reinforcement increases the rate of responding and results in different patterns of
responding compared to fixed schedules. Skinner (1953) argued that most games of
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chance on which humans often gamble are programmed using VR schedules of
monetary reinforcement, and concluded that the qualities of VR schedules were at least
partially responsible for the high rates of responding produced by these games. As with
the schedule research using non-human subjects, researchers have investigated the
effects of many types of reinforcement schedules on responding in human participant,
often by having participants respond on simple tasks that produce monetary outcomes
according to fixed or variable schedules (e.g., Pietras, Brandt, & Searcy, 2010). Although
researchers eventually concluded that games of chance actually operate on RR
schedules, VR and RR schedules have been shown to produce similar response patterns
in humans (see Hurlburt, Knapp, & Knowles, 1980) and behavioral psychologist
interested in gambling have continued to explore the role of these and other
unpredictable ratio schedules on responding on games of chance (Weatherly & Brandt,
2004).
Concurrent schedules of reinforcement. Another method used by operant
psychologists to study the effects of variability on behavior has been to analyze
responding on concurrent schedules of reinforcement. One benefit of concurrentschedule research over single-schedule research is that preference for one option over
another can provide a precise and sensitive measure of the effects of variability on the
value of a consequence as a reinforcer. On a concurrent schedules procedure (see,
Catania, 1969), two or more schedules are simultaneously available and each is
programmed on a separate operandum (Skinner, 1962). Similar to single-schedule
procedures, on current schedules both the rate and pattern of responding on each
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schedule can be assessed. However, because multiple response options are
simultaneously available, preference among the available schedules can also be
measured. On free-operant procedures (in which responding can occur continuously),
preference may be measured by relative response rates (see free-operant responding,
e.g., Ferster, 1957; Herrnstein, 1961; see also concurrent-chains procedure, e.g.,
Herrnstein, 1964) and in discrete trial procedures preference is measured by the
proportion of choices for each response alternative (e.g., Mazur, 1984) (see also Grace,
1996, for a discussion on the relatedness of these measures).
In a free-operant concurrent-schedules procedure, the effect of uncertainty on
reinforcer value has been studied by presenting subjects with choices between two
intermittent schedules (e.g., Davison, 1982). Preference on these tasks is measured by
the relative response rates on the available alternatives. A variant of this procedure is a
free-operant concurrent-chains procedure, in which each operandum is programmed to
produce reinforcers according to an independent chain schedule, each of which has an
initial- and terminal-link schedule (e.g., Herrnstein, 1961; Killeen, 1968). During the
initial link, responding can be freely distributed between the alternatives until one
schedule requirement is completed. Completing one initial-link schedule disables the
other schedule and produces the terminal link schedule. Responding on the terminal
link schedule produces primary reinforcement. In other words, this procedure involves
concurrently available schedules during the initial link (i.e., choice period), but only a
single schedule is active during the terminal link (i.e., consequence period) (Mazur,
2006). Because concurrent schedules are active only during the initial link, preference
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on this procedure is generally assessed as the relative response rates during the initial
link.
One problem with studying variability using free-operant schedules is that
programmed differences in the rate of reinforcement may also result in differing delays
to reinforcement (see Mazur, 1984). Thus, researchers have also studied choice using
discrete-trials procedures in which a single response to one option disables the
alternative and produces the reinforcer after a programmed delay (e.g., Mazur, 1984).
Because the researcher controls the trial duration and reinforcer delivery, the delays to
reinforcement following a response can be precisely controlled. Given that choice
responding is limited to a single period during each trial, the proportion of choices made
for an alternative indicates preference in this procedure.
Behavioral Models of Preference
A main finding of studies investigating preference on free-operant concurrent VI
VI schedules was that responding tended to be distributed according to the relative rate
of reinforcement (de Villiers & Hermstein, 1976; Herrnstein, 1961; Herrnstein, 1979),
and in some studies, the magnitude (Catania, 1963; Catania, 1969), on the available
alternatives. That is, the proportion of responding generated by any one schedule was a
function of the frequency or magnitude of reinforcement on that schedule relative to
the total available reinforcement. This general pattern is called matching and has been
shown across numerous species (Baum, 1979; de Villiers & Herrnstein, 1976). Matching
is also found with concurrent VIVR (Herrnstein & Heyman, 1979; McSweeney, Murphy,
& Kowal, 2001), and concurrent VR VR schedules (MacDonall, 1988). A different finding
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occurs when participants are given choice between fixed and variable options, such as
concurrent Fl VI (Davison, 1982; Killeen, 1968) or FR VR (Ahearn & Hineline, 1992)
schedules. Under these conditions, preference tends to be stronger for variable that
fixed schedules even with longer means (i.e., lower reinforcement) on the variable
option.
Herrnstein (1961) proposed that the pattern of pigeons' key pecking for food
reinforcers on concurrent VI VI schedules procedure could be accounted for by a simple
equation known as the Matching Law:
Bi

/?i

(Bi+62)

(R1 + R2)

where B is the rate of responding, R is the rate of reinforcement, and the subscripts (1
and 2) indicate the available response alternatives. In this model, the proportion of total
responding on an alternative equals the proportion of total reinforcement delivered on
that alternative. Although the simplicity of this model and its reliance on only
observable parameters makes it conceptually appealing, it is limited in two important
ways.
First, like EV maximization, the Matching Law predicts a linear relationship
between responding and reinforcement, however, behavioral studies of choice often
indicated that behavior deviated slightly from this prediction (see Baum, 1979). To
address this limitation, Baum (1974) proposed adding two free parameters to the
Matching Law, which resulted in the Generalized Matching Law (GML):

A = k (^-)a
B2

\/?2/
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where the free parameters, a and k, indicate sensitivity and bias, respectively. When
plotted as:
log (BJB2) = a log (/?i//?2) + log k
a is the slope and k is the y-intercept of the line fitted to the function between
responding and reinforcement. Undermatching and overamatching performances (i.e.,
deviations from perfect matching) can be described by the GML by using a less than or
greater than 1, respectively. Similarly, uncontrolled preference for one option (i.e., bias)
can be described by using k less than or greater than 1. Note that perfect matching
occurs when a and k equal 1, a condition that makes the GML reduce to the original
Matching Law (for an alternative model of choice, see Baum & Davison, 2009).
The second limitation of the Matching Law is that it failed to adequately predict
performance on concurrent-chains and discrete-trial procedures that involve choices
between delayed reinforcers (Fantino, 1969; Hermstein, 1964; Mazur, 1984; Squires &
Fantino, 1971), which tended to show greater preference for variable delays than for
fixed delays (Davison, 1969; Fantino, 1967; Killeen, 1968). Several models have been
developed to account for the influence of delayed reinforcers on choice (see contextualchoice model, Grace, 1994; see hyperbolic value-added model, Mazur, 1991; see delayreduction hypothesis, Preston & Fantino, 1991). These models tend to make somewhat
similar predictions to one another because each adjusts the reinforcement value that
enters into the Matching Law model according to one or more delay parameters.
On discrete-trial procedures, reinforcer value (V) is well described by a simple
form of the hyperbolic-decay model (Mazur, 1984):
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V=

(1

A
+ KD)

where A is reinforcer value with zero delay, D is the delay duration, and K is a free
parameter for the rate of value decay due to the delay. The hyperbolic nature of this
model indicates that initial reinforcer delays above zero have a far greater reductive
effect on value than similar increases at longer delays. For example, if A and K are
assumed to be 1 in the above model, an increase in delay from 0 to 1 sec reduces Vfrom
1 to 0.5, whereas an increase in delay from 9 to 10 sec only reduces Vfrom 0.11 to 0.10.
The hyperbolic-delay model has been shown to accurately describe non-human
choice on discrete-trial procedures (see Mazur, 2006, for a review). In many studies, it
has also been demonstrated that the hyperbolic-decay model describes much of the
variance in human choice under similar conditions (e.g., Lane, Cherek, Pietras, &
Tcheremissine, 2003; Madden et al., 2004; Yi, de la Piedad, & Bickel, 2006) A common
finding among non-human subjects (Davison, 1969; Essock & Reese, 1974; Mazur, 1984)
is a strong preference for options that produce reinforcement with variable delays
compared to fixed delays. A similar pattern, however is not seen in human subjects
when outcomes are conditioned reinforcers (see Kohn, Kohn, & Staddon, 1992; Pietras
& Hackenberg, 2001) but is obtained in studies using more consumable reinforcers (e.g.,
Locey, Pietras, & Hackenberg, 2009). The hyperbolic-decay model predicts preference
for variable over fixed schedules because a lower reinforcement value is assigned to a
reinforcer with a fixed delay than with variable delays with an equal mean. For example,
if A and /Care again assumed to be 1 in the hyperbolic-decay model and a reinforcer
with one of two possible delays occurs on one alternative, e.g., 1 or 9 sec (this is the
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simplest case of a variable schedule), and the delay on the other alternative is fixed and
equal to the mean delay on the variable alternative, i.e., 5 sec, then the mean
reinforcement value (V) is much smaller on the fixed (0.17) than on the variable (0.30)
alternative. Numerous studies have shown that the hyperbolic-decay model predicts
preference for variable delays across wide delay distributions (see Mazur, 2006).
Although this pattern is often called preference for variability, it may be more accurate
to describe this pattern as a disproportionately strong preference for schedules that at
least occasionally deliver short reinforcement delays.
In a few behavioral studies of choice, the effects of reinforcer uncertainty on
behavior was also studied using random schedules that produce reinforcers
probabilistically and several models have been developed to account for choice of
probabilistic reinforcers (e.g., Mazur, 1984; Rachlin, Castrogiovanni, & Cross, 1987).
These models generally assume that decreasing the probability of reinforcement below
1 has a similar effect on responding as increasing delay above zero seconds. That is, in
these models the value of a reinforcer that is delivered probabilistically is adjusted in a
similar fashion as a reinforcer that is delayed. Mazur, for example, included
reinforcement probability in the hyperbolic-decay model so that probabilities less than 1
reduced reinforcer value proportionately. The result was a generalized hyperbolic-decay
model (Mazur, 1984; Mazur, 1989):

where p is reinforcer probability associated with a particular delay. Notice that when the
delay is zero, then p is 1, and V=EV. Thus, the behavioral models of choice can be
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summarized as describing matching the expected value of the possible reinforcers given
the hyperbolic-discounting effects of delay on value.
Several studies have shown that models like generalized hyperbolic-decay
provide a good description of choice for probabilistic reinforcers (Mazur, 1985; Mazur,
1989; Mazur, 1991). However, other studies have indicated that probabilities are not
equivalent to delays. For instance, Green, Myerson, and Ostaszewski (1999) showed
that human participants discounted delayed and probabilistic hypothetical amounts of
money differently when large and small amounts were used.
Methodological Limitations of Reinforcement-Schedule Research for the Analysis of
Gambling
The many differences between the contingencies arranged in nonhuman choice
studies and those found in natural gambling environment complicate extensions of
operant research to real-world gambling. One difference is that much of the research by
operant psychologists on choice under uncertainty was conducted with non-human
animal subjects using primary reinforcers (food) in simplified environments. Whether
the results generalize to human responding for conditioned reinforcers in complex
gambling environments is therefore unclear. Results of several studies indicate
however, that nonhuman research on risk is relevant to human performance. For
example, studies have shown that conditioned and generalized reinforcers (e.g., tokens
exchangeable for money) generate similar patterns of behavior as primary reinforcers
(e.g., Hackenberg, 2009) and reinforcer delays have similar effects in human and nonhuman subjects when choice in humans is studied with more immediately consumable
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reinforcers (see Locey et al., 2009; Madden et al., 2005; Madden, Ewan, & Lagorio,
2007; Madden, Petry, & Johnson, 2009).
A second difficulty in generalizing results from operant schedule research to
gambling is that relative response rate, which is the most common measure of
preference in free-operant risky-choice studies, may not be particularly relevant to
performance on most games of chance. Unlike free-operant procedures, games of
chance operate very similarly to the discrete-trial procedures in that they allow
responding only during specific periods. Specifically, wagers on a game of chance can
only be made at certain times that are clearly signaled during game play. The inter-trial
intervals varies across different games of chance, for instance, games such as slot
machines and most video-based games allow relatively frequent responding, whereas
games such as keno or par-mutual betting allow only infrequent wagering. Because all
games of chance place some restrictions on when responding is available, however,
performance is not readily analyzable in terms of response rate (for a discussion on the
influence of inter-trial intervals on responding, see Mazur, 2001).
Another problem in applying results of operant studies on risky choice to
gambling is that most operant studies do not program wagers or losses of reinforcers.
This problem is primarily due to practical limitations of arranging an initial wager (i.e.,
response cost) for non-humans when the reinforcer is food or anther primary
consumable reinforcers. As a result, no studies with nonhumans have investigated the
influence of wagering on risk preferences. Research on token reinforcement, however,
has shown that responses in non-human subjects may be maintained by presentations
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of token reinforcers (e.g., lights or tokens paired with food) and punished by token
removal (e.g., Raiff, Bullock, & Hackenberg, 2008; Yankelevitz, Bullock, & Hackenberg,
2008). Such a token procedure could also be used to study wagers in nonhumans, which
may improve the generalizability of animal models of gambling (see Kendall, 1987;
Madden et al., 2007).
Finally, operant studies have most often studied variability in the form of
reinforcer probability and delay instead of reinforcer amounts. This characteristic is
considerably different from cognitive studies on variability and from most real-world
games of chance that produce gains of varying reinforcer amounts with different
probabilities. Variability in reinforcer amount or probability tends to produce risk-averse
preferences in humans (e.g., Kohn, Kohn, and Staddon, 1992; Lane & Cherek, 2000;
Pietras & Hackenberg, 2003) and nonhumans (Barnard & Brown, 1985) whereas
variability in reinforcer delay tends to produce risk-prone choices in humans (Pietras &
Hackenberg, 2001) and nonhumans (see Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996). Although some
researchers have conceptualized probabilistic reinforcement as delayed reinforcement
(Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986), as described above, research has shown that
delay and probability are not entirely equivalent.
Summary
The methods used by operant psychologists to study the effects of uncertainty
on behavior differ in several important ways from those used by cognitive psychologists,
for instance, outcomes are experienced instead of verbally described, behavior is
studied across repeated exposure to outcomes, and consequences tend to be real
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rather than hypothetical. Operant research has provided important information about
the influence of variability on responding. This research has shown that variable
schedules generate greater preference and higher response rates than fixed schedules,
that delays to reinforcement produce a predictable reduction in reinforcer value, and
that non-human subjects prefer variable over fixed delays to reinforcement. This
research has also shown that when humans and nonhumans are given choices between
fixed and variable amounts, choice tends to be risk averse. Nonetheless, the lack of
wagers, the limited outcomes on choice tasks, and the greater emphasis on variability in
delays than variability in reinforcer probability or amount limits the generalizability of
much operant research to gambling.
SIMULATED-GAMBLING RESEARCH
General Methods
Given the many differences between the contingencies programmed on games
of chance and those typically arranged in laboratory studies of choice under uncertainty,
some researchers have begun to use simulated of games of chance to study gambling
behavior more directly under laboratory conditions.
Although apparatuses analogous to real-world gambles have a long history of
use in studies on preference (see Hurlburt et al., 1980; Lewis & Duncan, 1956; Murray
1971), studying gambling using simulated games of chance was relatively uncommon
prior to the development of several computerized games that could be easily (and
legally) used in a laboratory setting. These simulations include: video-poker simulations,
Dixon, MacLin, & Hayes, 1999; roulette simulations, Machlin & Dixon, 2004; and slot-
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machine simulations, MacLin, Dixon, & Hayes, 1999. These simulations allowed
researchers a high degree of control over various parameters of the gambling game,
including the type of game, the number of game options, wager amounts, the range of
possible winning outcomes, and winning outcome values. Using these procedures,
behavioral researchers have investigated the effects on gambling of numerous
environmental variables, such as percentage payback (see Brandt & Pietras, 2008;
Schreiber & Dixon, 2001; Weatherly & Brandt, 2004), token value (Weatherly & Brandt,
2004), reinforcement frequency (see Dixon, MacLin, & Daugherty, 2006), near-miss
frequency (see Kassinove & Schare, 2001; MacLin, Dixon, Daugherty, & Small, 2007), the
frequency of a "big win" (see Kassinove & Schare, 2001; Weatherly, Sauter, & King,
2004), and the participant stake (see Weatherly, McDougall, & Gillis, 2006).
Simulated-gambling procedures. On simulated gambling tasks, the outcome
probabilities are determined by sampling a random number generator following each
response, (i.e., a RR schedule) or are predetermined to yield a RR schedule of a specific
value. Simulated-gambling procedures can be categorized according to the type and
number of response options available to the participant. Gambling has most often been
studied by instructing participants that they may gamble on a single gamble option for a
certain amount of time and that they may quit gambling at any time during a session
(e.g., Brandt & Pietras, 2008; Weatherly & Brandt, 2004; Weatherly, Sauter, & King,
2004). This procedure may be described as a single-option gamble procedure because
there is only one response option available, the gamble. For example, Weatherly and
Brandt (2004) staked participants with points exchangeable for money, which could be
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gambled on a single-option simulated slot machine. Across two experiments, the effects
of PP (75%, 83%, and 95%) and point value ($0.00, $0.01, and $0.10) on gambling was
investigated. The results showed that fewer wagers were made as the point value
increased, however, no effect of PP on gambling was found.
One problem with single-option gamble procedures is that participants are not
required to gamble so individual differences in gambling (e.g., number of bet placed)
can influence participants' exposure to the experimental conditions. That is, participants
who quit early may not experience the same contingencies as other participants. To
better control participants' exposure to the independent variables, researchers have
used procedures that require participants to gamble during part of a session (usually the
start of a session), and quitting is not provided as an explicit option (see Dixon, 2000;
Dixon, Hayes, & Aban, 2000; Dixon et al., 2006; Dixon & Schreiber, 2002; Kassinove &
Schare, 2001; MacLin et al., 2007; Schreiber & Dixon, 2001). This type of forced-gamble
procedure increases the consistency between participants' experience with the
experimental contingencies and the programmed contingencies, and therefore may
improve the internal validity of some investigations.
Researchers have also combined these two methods. Schreiber and Dixon
(2001), for example, instructed participants to gamble 50 times on a single-option
simulated slot machine with points (exchangeable for entries into a cash lottery) given
to them by the experimenter, after which they could quit gambling at any time. The PP
of the machine during the initial 50 forced trials was varied across three conditions
(40%, 80%, and 120%) but was 0% (i.e., extinction) during the free-gambling phase that
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followed. This manipulation had no significant effect on either the number of trials
played during extinction or on response latencies between the end of one gamble and a
subsequent wager during forced trials, however, it was found that the latter was far
greater following wins than losses, a similar pattern of post-reinforcement pausing as
seen in non-human subjects.
An alternative to the single-option approach is to present participants with
multiple gamble alternatives available concurrently (Dixon et al., 2006; MacLin et al.,
2007). Similar to the discrete-trials procedures, concurrent-gambles procedures can be
used to arrange two simultaneously available independent gamble options. Like the
single-option procedures, however, concurrent-gambles procedures used to date have
not provided an alternative to gambling and participants are simply instructed to play
until the session terminates (see Dixon et al., 2006).
Limitations of current simulated-gambling procedures. Despite the greater
similarity between contingencies generated in simulated-gambling procedures and
those found in real-world gambling, there still remain many differences between these
simulated gambling tasks and contingencies found in natural gambling environment.
One difference between gambling simulations and casino games is that researchers
have made wagering possible by giving the participants points or tokens at the start of a
session so that they are not required to gamble with their own money. The practice of
staking participants with "house money" has been criticized because participants may
show elevated levels of risk taking when they gamble with staked rather than earned
money (see Madden et al., 2007; Weatherly & Phelps, 2006). Support for this has come
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from risky-choice research (Garling & Romanus, 1997; Hollenbeck, llgen, Phillips, &
Hedlund, 1994; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Weber & Zuchel, 2005), and on one case
gambling research (Ladouceur, Gaboury, Bujold, Lachance, &Tremblay, 1991).
For example, Thaler and Johnson (1990) presented participants with two-stage
decision problems that involved an initial hypothetical gain or loss of money after which
the participant was asked to make a risky choice with their own money (note, however,
that participants were deceived to believe that they could loose their own money and
no actual losses occurred). Across all conditions, participants showed strong risk
proneness in the second stage if they had experienced a gain in the first stage compared
to when they experienced a loss. That is, choice was risk prone when participants were
risking house money (i.e., prior gains). The authors suggested that this pattern occurred
because the potential loss in the second stage was less aversive when it was a loss of
money they had won compared to when it was a loss of their own money (money
brought to the experiment by the participant).
Ladouceur et al. (1991) showed a similar effect between gambling on a videopoker machine in a laboratory and a grocery store (a legal form of gambling in Quebec,
Canada). Participants were all regular gamblers that failed to meet criteria for
pathological gambling. Participants were matched to groups based on the mean amount
bet each week. Those in the laboratory condition were staked with an amount of money
equal to this value whereas in the natural setting participants could gamble with their
own money up to this value. The results indicated that participants wagered significantly
more money in the laboratory than in the natural setting. Together, these studies
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showed that risk varied depending on whether participants risked their own or the
experimenter's money.
Another difference between gambling simulations and casino games is the
number of response options available. As described above, in the laboratory, gambling
is often studied using single-option procedures in which participants are instructed that
they may gamble on the experimental task for a certain amount of time and that they
may quit gambling at any time during a session. Participants can only earn money,
however, by responding on the gamble option. Outside the laboratory, a gambler has
many available gamble and non-gamble response options that may produce
reinforcement. Using only a single option may therefore produce levels of gambling that
may not be observed under circumstances that are more naturalistic. For example,
participants may persist on an unprofitable option (i.e., a gamble option) much longer
than would occur if multiple response options were available. Even on concurrentgamble procedures, participants are generally not allowed to quit at anytime (and still
receive compensation) and only gamble options are made available. Thus, as with the
single-option procedures, gambling is the only response that will produce reinforcers.
Simulated gambling procedures may also arrange unintentional demand
characteristics that influence gambling (Weatherly & Phelps, 2006). Demand
characteristics describe the characteristics of a procedure that may potentially inform
the participant about the experimental goals (Orne, 1962). In single-option gamble
procedures, for example, participants are given only one option and are instructed that
they may gamble for some period during the session. However, because participants
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know they are in a laboratory study on gambling, they may believe the experimenter
does not view quitting as a desirable response and therefore they may place more bets
then they would under similar conditions outside the laboratory.
In summary, the use of a participant stake and the limited response options
given to participants raise concerns about the ecological validity of the results from
experiments using gambling simulations. Although simulated-gambling procedures offer
many advantages to single-operant and concurrent-schedules procedures, few
researchers have continued to develop these tasks to better model gambling in the
natural environment. By better simulating real-world gambling environments,
researchers may improve their ability to predict and modify gambling outside the
laboratory.
Concurrent Gamble No-Gamble Procedure
A gambling procedure that may better simulate natural gambling contingencies
in a laboratory context and that offers several methodological improvements over
existing gambling procedures is a concurrent gamble no-gamble procedure. This task
could program two independent and simultaneously available options: a gambling
option and a non-gambling option. Thus, unlike previous single-option and concurrentgambling procedures, a gamble option would always be available but gambling would
not be required. This approach is similar to the concurrent-gambles procedures, with
the primary difference that at least one option does not involve gambling.
An important advantage of a concurrent gamble no-gamble task is that it may
not place the same demand characteristics on gambling as single-option or concurrent-
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gambles tasks. In natural gambling environments, people are rarely obligated to gamble
and they have numerous no-gamble response options available (eating, drinking,
conversing, observing others, walking around, etc.). In concurrent-gambles procedures,
however, participants would not be required to gamble (see Weatherly & Phelps, 2006).
Quit options are typically given to participants during single-option procedures, but very
few participants quit a session without gambling (Weatherly et al., 2006). Such findings
suggest that participants may have certain expectations about how their performance
will be evaluated, for example, they may believe that quitting a session or the
experiment, at least immediately, is not a desirable outcome for the experimenter. As
described above, if simulated gambling procedures produced such expectations,
gambling in laboratory studies is likely elevated compared to the levels found in the
natural environment. Because a concurrent gamble token-production procedure can be
programmed to deliver reinforcement on both options, it may reduce demand
characteristics and produce gambling patterns that are more comparable to those
outside the laboratory.
Another important benefit of a concurrent gamble token-production procedure
compared to single-option procedures, is that it may better assess the sensitivity of
gambling to reinforcement and punishment contingencies, including the size and
frequency of gains and losses. Numerous studies with non-human subjects have shown
that behavior tends to be relatively insensitive to changes in reinforcement variables,
such as reinforcer magnitude, when responding is measured using single-schedule
procedures, whereas behavior tends to be more sensitive to the same manipulations
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when measured using a concurrent-schedules procedure (for a review see Bonem &
Crossman, 1988). For example, Catania (1963) showed that pigeon's rates of key pecking
were insensitive to changes in reinforcer duration when duration was manipulated
across conditions on a single variable-interval (VI) schedule, but that responding was
more sensitive to reinforcer duration when duration was manipulated on one option of
a concurrent VIVI schedule. A similar finding has been reported in studies investigating
the effects of reinforcer size and probability on gambling. Brandt and Pietras (2008)
found that gambling was generally insensitive to changes in win size and frequency
when participants were exposed to a single-option gambling procedure, whereas Dixon
et al. (2006) showed that behavior was sensitive to these variables when participants
were exposed to a concurrent-gambles procedure. Together, these findings suggest that
concurrent-schedules procedures may provide a more sensitive measure of the effects
on gambling of changes in gains and losses compared to single-option procedures.
A third methodological improvement made possible by the concurrent gamble
no-gamble procedure is that it can eliminate the need to use a participant stake. As
described above, an important difference between gambling on laboratory simulations
versus gambling under naturalistic conditions is that in the laboratory, participants
gamble with tokens or money given to them by the experimenter. That money is given
freely to participants may influence levels of gambling. In a concurrent task, an option
that delivers response-contingent tokens could be programmed concurrently with the
gamble option. Participants could use the tokens earned on the no-gamble option as a
stake for the gambling option. This procedure would allow the participant to earn
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tokens within a session and to gamble only those tokens earned or won by responding
on the gamble option. This procedure minimizes ethical concerns of allowing
participants to gamble with their own money because potential losses are limited to the
amount earned during the task. At the same time, this approach better models realworld gambling because it requires that individuals wager money they have earned
rather than money that has been given to them.
In summary, a concurrent gamble no-gamble task may have several advantages
over other gambling simulations in that it may better model important features of
natural gambling environments. One primary goal of this project was to develop and
test a concurrent gamble no-gamble task and compare gambling on this new procedure
to gambling on existing procedures. The laboratory procedure that was developed for
this project was a non-computerized card game. The experimenter served as the dealer
and the participant was repeatedly offered choices between a no-gamble and a gamble
option that could produce tokens exchangeable for entries into a $50 lottery. This type
of "in person" simulation has been used in other simulated gambling studies (e.g.,
Dixon, 2000), but is less common than computer simulations because of the greater
resources needed to record and quantify responding (see Weatherly & Phelps, 2006).
This non-computerized game was used in part because it allowed rapid changes in
experimental contingencies, was simple to arrange, and had face validity (i.e., many
casino games involve cards). To minimize the possibility that a participants' experience
with a particular game would influence responding (see Haw, 2007), the task was a
novel card game (designed by the experimenter) that did not closely resemble any
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common casino game. The card game modeled important characteristics of gamble
contingencies discussed above and allowed the experimenter to control the outcome
probabilities and magnitudes.
SUMMARY AND RATIONALE
Psychologists have had a longstanding interest in studying choice under
conditions of uncertainty, yet most decision research has not directly focused on the
analysis of gambling. Both human decision-making research and behavioral research on
intermittent reinforcement schedules has made valuable contributions to our
understanding of the effects of uncertainty on responding, however, the procedures
used in these studies do not closely model real-world gambling contingencies. As a
result, the extent to which the findings of this research directly inform the analysis of
gambling is unclear.
Operant psychologists have recently developed several computer simulations of
common casino-style games of chance that have allowed researchers to better model
gambling contingencies. Nevertheless, the contingencies arranged by these procedures
still differ in several respects from gambling contingencies found outside the laboratory.
For example, in these procedures participants are staked with tokens prior to
experimental sessions and participants are only presented with gambling response
options. These features may inadvertently increase the likelihood of gambling. The
main goals of the present research were to (a) investigate whether the number of
response options or the participant stake influence gambling, and (b) examine behavior
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under new experimental task that presented participants with concurrent gamble and
no-gamble response options.
Four experiments were conducted. Three experiments compared gambling
across conditions in which (a) a no-gamble option was or was not concurrently available
with a gamble option (Experiments 1 and 2), and (b) a stake was or was not given to
participants prior to experimental sessions (Experiment 3). Experiments 2, 3, and 4 also
examined the extent to which the reinforcement magnitude (i.e., number of tokens)
produced on the no-gamble option influenced gambling. These experiments helped to
determine whether methodological features of typical laboratory gambling procedures
influenced gambling and evaluated the utility of the new concurrent gamble no-gamble
procedure.
EXPERIMENT 1
Laboratory gambling procedures that only provide participants with a gambling
option may not provide an accurate assessment of gambling because they do not closely
model options available to the gambler in the natural environment. First, participants in
gambling studies are usually given instructions to respond or to earn as much as
possible (see Weatherly et al., 2004), but no alternative to gambling is available. Thus,
experimenter demand may inflate gambling levels. Second, gamblers typically have
many choice alternatives that do not involve gambling, so responding on procedures in
which gambling is the only option may not closely resemble real-world gambling
conditions. By providing an alternative no-gamble response option, the concurrent
gamble no-gamble procedure described above may provide a better assessment of
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gambling. To date, no study has compared gambling on a gambling-only procedure and
concurrent gamble no-gamble procedure. If the concurrent gamble no-gamble
procedure indeed produces fewer demand characteristics than the single-option
procedure, it would be expected that reduced levels of gambling would be observed.
Experiment 1 was therefore designed to compare gambling on a single-option
gambling procedure to gambling on a concurrent gamble no-gamble procedure. On the
standard procedure, on each choice trial participants could choose the gamble option or
choose to quit the game (Quit condition), whereas on the gamble no-gamble procedure
participants could choose the gamble option or an option that simply progressed the
game to the next trial (Pass condition). In the Quit condition, a single response to the
quit option terminated the session. In the Pass condition, a response to the pass option
resulted in a 45-s timeout followed by the next trial. Across conditions, responses on the
quit and pass options produced the same net reinforcement (0 tokens). This
investigation was designed to examine whether equivalent levels of gambling would be
generated when the participant could only gamble or could chose among a gamble and
no-gamble (pass) option. It was hypothesized that the number of gambles would be
greater in the single-operant (Quit) condition than in the concurrent-operant (Pass)
condition.
Method
Participants. Twenty participants (14 females, 6 males) aged 18-21 (M = 18.8
years) were recruited via flyers posted at Albion College. The flyers invited male and
female students to participate in a study on decision making for course credit and a

49

chance to win $50. Participants were informed that each token earned during their
participation was equivalent to one entry into a $50 lottery and that one lottery winner
was chosen from every 10 participants in the experiment.
Setting and apparatus. Experimental sessions were conducted in a sound
attenuated experimental room (2 m x 2 m x 2.6 m). The room contained a desk,
personal computer, digital video camera, game table, two chairs, and several lamps. The
game table (1.02 m long, 0.76 m wide, and 0.76 m high) was positioned perpendicular to
the desk (2 m x 0.6 m x 1.4 m). Items used to play the game included bridge-sized
playing cards (Hoyle Super Jumbo Index), game chips (4 cm in diameter), and a choice
marker (a 5 cm x 5 cm x 5 cm glass cube). The digital video camera (mounted on a
tripod) was positioned on the desk and was pointed towards the game table surface for
data collection. The computer was also positioned on the desk and was used to time
experimental trials.
The deck of playing cards was used to determine the outcome of each gamble
and contained 51 cards: 2 jokers, 23 sevens, and 26 threes. A payout table was located
on the desk near the participant and indicated three winning combination of cards: 3 3cards equaled 3 tokens, 3 7-cards equaled 7 tokens, and 3 joker-cards equaled 50 tokens
(see Figure 1). Because the deck contained 2 jokers, however, 3 jokers was not a
possible outcome. This outcome was shown on the payout table in order to mimic
payout tables found on many casino games in which one or more high value but low
probability outcomes are displayed as a possible response outcome. The programmed
PP of the gamble option was 104% (EV = 0.04 tokens).
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Experimental design. A repeated-measures design was used to investigate the
effects of the number of available response options (one or two) on the number of
gambles per session. All participants were randomly assigned to a condition order and
experienced each condition only once. Each participant received individual exposure to
the conditions during two consecutive 25-min sessions (separated by a 5-min break).
Procedure. After informed consent, demographic information (e.g., age, gender,
college major, and ethnic background) was collected from all participants. Prior to the
participant entering the experimental room, the experimenter (a) placed 30 tokens in
the participant token section of the game table (i.e., the participant's stake was 30
tokens), (b) arranged the gamble option by placing four face-down cards on the gamble
option (see below), and (c) arranged the no-gamble or quit option by placing a facedown card or no card, respectively, on the no-gamble option. The game table is shown
in Figure 2. At the start of each session, the experimenter provided a single
demonstration of each response alternative. If the first session was the Pass condition,
the experimenter read the following instructions:
When you choose this option [the experimenter pointed to the gamble option,
which had one card in each of the four rectangles], I will remove one of your
tokens and place it on the card in front of the marker. I will then turn over the
remaining three cards. If those three cards match any of the combinations on
the payout table, you will receive the number of tokens indicated. If you select
this option [the experimenter pointed to the no-gamble option, which had a
face-down card in the Pass condition or no card in the Quit condition], you will
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not lose any of your tokens, but you also will not receive any tokens. Do you
have any questions?
For the Quit condition, the last sentence of the previous instruction was changed to:
Anytime you are presented with the marker, you may choose to quit playing the
game by selecting this option (the experimenter pointed to the no-gamble
option). Doing so will immediately end the session. Do you have any questions?
Following the instructions, the experimenter shuffled the deck of cards and placed one
card in each of the four rectangles on the gambling option. The experimenter then
started the timer.
Each experimental session consisted of 30 trials. At the beginning of each trial,
the experimenter placed the marker in front of the participant. The participant had
approximately 3 s to make their choice. If 3 s elapsed and a choice was not made, the
experimenter prompted the participant to make a choice. In the Pass condition,
participants made choices between a gamble and a no-gamble option. The no-gamble
option produced a 45-s timeout (all trials lasted 45-s) followed by the start of the next
trial. Note that in this condition, the expected value of the gamble (0.04 tokens) was
similar to the value produced by responding on the pass option (0 tokens). In the Quit
condition, participants could only chose the gamble option, and were instructed that a
single response to the quit option would terminate the session.
The gamble option was the same in both conditions. Each choice of the gamble
option cost the participant 1 token and could result in the participant loosing that token
or wining 3 or 7 tokens. Participants chose the gamble option by placing the marker on

52

one of the four squares in front of the four cards on that option. When the gamble
option was selected, the experimenter removed one token from participant's token
section of the game table and placed it on the card in front of the marker. The
experimenter then turned over the three cards that did not have a token on them and
reported the value of each card as it was turned over. If those three cards did not match
the winning combinations indicated on the payout table, the participant lost the token
that was wagered. Following a loss, the experimenter said, "House wins" and the token
was placed in the experimenter's token section of the game table. If the three cards
matched a winning combination, the number of tokens indicated on the payout table
were placed in the participant's token section of the game table (i.e., the net value of a
win was the stated value minus one). Following a win, the experimenter said, "Player
wins three" or "Player wins seven" (depending on the outcome) and placed the
appropriate number of tokens in the participant's token section of the game table. At
the start of each trial, the experimenter placed four new cards on the gamble option.
The experimenter shuffled the deck of cards after every five trials. After completing
both sessions, participants were debriefed and those who were enrolled in a psychology
course offering course credit for research participation received a credit slip.
Participants who won the $50 lotteries were contacted via email.
Results
Figure 3 shows the mean number of gambles per session in the Quit and Pass
conditions and the error bars show the standard error of the mean (error bars on all of
the following figures indicate the standard error of the mean). The results indicate the
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mean number of gambles per session was near the maximum number of possible
gambles (30 per session) in both the Quit (M = 23.35, SD = 9.66) and Pass [M = 24.85, SD
= 6.73) conditions. The results of a paired-samples t-test confirmed that the total
number of gambles did not differ significantly across the Quit and Pass conditions, t(19)
= 1.157, p = 0.262.
Figure 4 shows the mean percent payback experienced by participants on the
gambling option. The percent payback was similar across the Quit {M = 99.47%, SD =
40.07) and Pass (M = 98.60%, SD = 42.47) conditions. Figure 5 shows the mean number
of tokens participants accumulated at the end of a session, which was also similar across
the Quit (M = 29.85, SD = 9.20) and Pass (M = 31, SD = 9.97) conditions.
Although the overall level of gambling in the Quit and Pass conditions was
similar, the pattern of gambling was not. Figure 6 shows the mean consecutive gambles
(i.e., the number of gambles that were placed prior to a single quit or pass response) per
session in the Quit and Pass conditions (data from the Quit condition are the same as
those shown in Figure 3). These data indicate that participants made a single response
to the pass option (M = 15.40, SD = 12.42) much earlier during a session compared to a
response to the quit option (M = 23.35, SD = 9.66), which implies that the pattern of
responding during the Pass condition involved interspersed no-gamble responses
between strings of gamble responses, a pattern that was not possible in the Quit
condition. The results of a paired-samples t-test confirmed that the consecutive gambles
was significantly lower in the Pass condition, t(19) = 2.944, p = 0.008. Together, the data
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in Figures 3 and 6 show that providing a pass option influenced participants' gambling
pattern, but not their overall level of gambling compared to a quit option.
To assess possible sequence effects, the data were separated by session and
condition order. Figure 7 shows the mean number of gambles in Sessions 1 and 2 for
participants in either the Quit-Pass or the Pass-Quit condition order. Figure 7 shows that
gambling was similar regardless of whether participants were exposed to the Quit-Pass
or Pass-Quit condition sequence. The results of a mixed-model analysis of variance
(ANOVA) confirmed there was no effect of session, condition order, or session by
condition order interaction on gambling.
Discussion
Experiment 1 examined gambling when participants either did or did not have a
pass option available. The results showed that gambling occurred on most trials during
both the Quit and Pass conditions. These data suggest that single-option gambling
procedures do not generate more gambling than a concurrent gamble no-gamble
procedure on which a pass option is concurrently available with gambling. Several
features of the procedure may have contributed to this outcome.
First, participants had more opportunities to gamble in the Pass than Quit
condition. In the Quit condition, the total number of choices for the gamble option
represented the number of consecutive gambles prior to a response on the quit option.
In this condition then, the total number of trials completed could vary between 0 and
30. In the Pass condition, the total gambles during a session indicated the number of
choices for the gamble option interspersed with choices for the pass option across 30
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trials. To make statistical comparisons all data were scaled as total number of choices
for the gamble option. However, it is clear that these measures do not necessarily
indicate the same type of responding. That is, in the Pass condition, choices for the
gamble option include responses that occurred on trials after the non-gambling option
was chosen. There were no opportunities to gamble after a quit response in the Quit
condition. Plotting data as a proportion of gambles per opportunity does not completely
resolve this measurement issue because opportunities were not equivalent across
conditions. The number of consecutive gambles prior to the first no-gamble response
may therefore provide a better measure of preference for the gambling option. The
fewer number of consecutive gambles before a no-gamble response in the Pass
condition compared to the Quit condition suggests that the single-option (Quit) tasks
may generate greater levels of gambling than multiple-option tasks.
It is uncertain why participants made fewer consecutive gambles before a nogamble response during the Pass than Quit condition. Possibly, the pass option allowed
participants to control their rate of gambling, which may have functioned to reduce
their immediate level of risk. In other words, participants' immediate level of risk could
be reduced by choosing the pass option in the Pass condition, which did not remove
them from the overall gambling situation, whereas, a similar response was not possible
in the Quit condition because quitting terminated the session.
Another reason why total number of choices for the gamble option may have
been similar across Pass and Quit conditions is that in both conditions participants
experienced comparable levels of experimenter demand. As suggested above, a possible
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characteristic of single-option procedures is they may inflate participants' level of
gambling as a result of experimental demand for gambling. In the present study, in both
the Pass and Quit conditions experimental demand for gambling may have influenced
responding because, although participants were given a non-gambling option, neither
the pass or quit option may have been viewed by the participant as a desirable response
in a study of gambling.
Finally, the similarity in gambling across Pass and Quit conditions may have
occurred because neither the pass nor quit option produced tokens. In both conditions,
participants could only earn tokens by selecting the gamble option. It is possible that
differences in gambling on single-option and gamble no-gamble procedures will occur
only when both options deliver tokens for responding.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 was designed to compare gambling across conditions in which (a)
only a gamble option was available (Quit condition), or (b) a gamble and a no-gamble
option were concurrently available (Pass condition). The Pass condition was designed so
that the net reinforcement was equal to that in the Quit condition (0 tokens), a
condition commonly used in past research. Although this feature made the rates of
expected token delivery equal across conditions, it may not have provided a robust test
of the effects of including a no-gamble alternative during a gambling session. That is, the
contingencies arranged in each of these conditions may have been quite similar in that
neither responding on the quit nor pass option delivered tokens. The only notable
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difference between the two options was that quitting terminated all gambling
opportunities whereas passing terminated only the present gambling opportunity.
It is possible that gambling will occur at high levels whenever it is the only option
that produces reinforcers. To test this possibility, Experiment 2 was designed to
investigate gambling under a single-option condition and concurrent gamble no-gamble
condition when the no-gamble option produced tokens on every response, i.e., a FR 1
schedule.
Several risky choice studies with humans (Pietras, Searcy, Huitema, & Brandt,
2008) and nonhumans (Young, 1981) have shown that when fixed and variable
reinforcer amounts are presented concurrently, choice of the variable option is affected
by the value of the fixed option. For example, Young (1981) investigated key pecking in
pigeons on a concurrent-schedules procedure in which one option produced a certain
amount of food and the other produced an uncertain amount. Young found a linear
relationship between these values: as the value of the certain amount increased,
preference for the uncertain amount decreased. Results of these studies suggest that
the effects of the no-gamble option on gambling might vary depending on the
magnitude of reinforcement provided by that option.
In Experiment 2, two reinforcer amounts on the token-production option were
therefore investigated: 1 token (TP1) and 3 tokens (TP3). This manipulation was
designed to assess whether the token magnitude produced on a token-production
option influenced responding on the gamble option. Preference for the gamble option
was tested across three conditions, TP1, TP3, and Quit conditions. As in Experiment 1, it
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was hypothesized that the number of gambles would be greater in the single-option
condition (Quit) than in both the concurrent gamble token-production conditions (TP1
and TP3). It was also hypothesized that preference for the gamble option would
decrease as the token value of the token-production option in increased, i.e., more
gambling would occur in TP1 than TP3 conditions.
Method
Participants. Participants were seven students (7 females) aged 18-21 (M = 19
years). Participants were given identical incentives as participants in Experiment 1.
Setting and apparatus. The setting and apparatus were identical to Experiment
1.
Experimental design. Similar to Experiment 1, a repeated-measures design was
used to investigate gambling on a single-option procedure (Quit), which was identical to
the single-option condition in Experiment 1 and a concurrent gamble token-production
procedure on which the token-production option produced 1 or 3 tokens with certainty
(TP1 and TP3, respectively). In all conditions, the gamble option was the same as in
Experiment 1. All participants were randomly assigned to a condition order and
experienced each condition once. Each participant received individual exposure to
conditions during three consecutive 25-min sessions (separated by 5-min breaks).
Procedure. All aspects of the procedures were the same as in Experiment 1 with
the following exceptions. First, prior to the participant entering the experimental room,
the experimenter arranged the quit or token-production option by placing either a facedown card (Quit), an ace-card (TP1), or a 3-card (TP3) on the no-gamble option. Second,
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the instructions were changed to reflect the fact that responses to the token-production
option in the TP1 and TP3 conditions would produce tokens. The new section of the
instructions read:
When you choose this option [the experimenter pointed to the no-gamble
option], you will earn the number of tokens indicated on the card. So, each time
you choose this option I will say "player earns one" [or three] and you will earn 1
[or 3] token.
Results
Figure 8 shows the mean number of gambles per session in the Quit, TP1 and
TP3 conditions. These results indicate that participants tended to place more gambles in
the Quit condition (M = 26.3, SD = 9.8), than in either the TP1 (M = 16.1, SD = 10.98) or
TP3 (M = 13.3, SD = 9.38) conditions. This finding was supported by the results of a oneway repeated-measures ANOVA, which indicated a significant effect of condition on
gambling, Wilks' Lambda = 0.204, F(2,5) = 9.766, p = 0.019 (the multivariate results of
this analysis are reported because these data showed significant non-sphericity, W =
0.70, p = 0.001; £H-F = 0.529) (see O'Brian & Kaiser, 1985). Bonferroni contrasts on all
pairwise comparisons (based on the critical tB(4,6) = 3.521) indicated that significantly
more gambles occurred in the Quit condition than in the TP3 condition, tB = 4.10, but no
other pairwise comparisons reached significance. However, a complex Bonferroni
contrast (based on the critical tB(4,18) = 2.775) between the Quit condition and both the
TP1 and TP3 conditions combined showed that significantly more gambles occurred in
the Quit condition, tB = 3.01.
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Figure 9 shows data for each participant. Response patterns in individuals are
similar to the means shown in Figure 8, however, the individual data show that the large
reduction in responding from Quit to TP1 and TP3 conditions was due primarily to
behavior of two participants. For the remaining four participants, the decrease was less
marked, and for one participant there was a slight increase in gambling. Overall, six of
seven participants showed a decrease in preference for the gambling option under TP
conditions.
Figure 10 shows the percent payback experienced by participants on the
gambling option. The PP was slightly lower in the Quit (M = 79.29%, SD = 38.26) than in
the TP1 (M = 89.57%, SD = 68.83) and TP3 (M = 86.0%, SD = 56.52) conditions and the PP
in all conditions was somewhat lower than the programmed value.
Figure 11 shows the mean number of tokens earned on the token-production
option and participants' token total at the end of a session, both of which differed
considerably across conditions. The tokens earned on the token-production option
increased from the TP1 (M = 14, SD = 11.21) to TP3 (M = 49.71, SD = 27.43) condition
due to the increase in token magnitude on that option. Similarly, token totals at the end
of a session also increased across the Quit (M = 27A3, SD = 4.72), TP1 (M = 49, SD =
9.24), and TP3 (M = 80.71, SD = 24.90) conditions due to the greater number of tokens
delivered on the token-production option, as well as the greater number of choices for
the no-gamble option.
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Discussion
Experiment 1 showed that when a concurrent no-gamble (pass) option was
made available on a gambling task, levels of gambling did not differ significantly from
conditions in which only a single-option (quit) was available. The present study
investigated gambling when the concurrent no-gamble response option also provided
reinforcement (a token-production option). Across conditions, the magnitude of
reinforcement on the token-production option was manipulated. Unlike Experiment 1,
gambling significantly decreased from Quit conditions when the concurrent tokenproduction option was available. There was a slight further decrease in gambling as the
magnitude of reinforcement on the token-production option increased from one to
three tokens, but the effect was small and did not reach statistical significance.
It was possible that less gambling occurred in TP conditions than in the Quit
condition simply because the reinforcement produced on the token-production option
(EV = 1 or 3 tokens) was greater than the reinforcement gambling ( f V = 0 tokens). It is
interesting to note, however, that there was little difference in gambling across TP1 and
TP3 conditions despite the threefold difference in EV. This suggests that the reduction in
gambling from Quit to TP conditions may have occurred not only because the nogambling option had a greater EVthan the gambling option in TP conditions, but also
because the TP option provided a no-gambling response alternative. That is, gambling
may have decreased across conditions simply because a reinforced, no-gambling option
was available.
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The presence of the no-gambling option token-production option may have
reduced gambling because it reduced experimental demand characteristics. If so, these
findings, along with those from Experiment 1, suggest that experimental demands for
gambling may be high when only a single gamble option is available or when only the
gambling option produces reinforcement. Providing an alternative, token-production
option may effectively reduce experimenter demand.
That gambling was not significantly affected by the magnitude of reinforcement
on the token-production option contrasts with previous risky-choice research (e.g.,
Young, 1981). For two participants, the lack of difference between the two TP conditions
likely was due to a floor effect: gambling in the TP1 condition was already at near-zero
levels. For the remaining participants, gambling decreased across conditions, but only
slightly. Possibly, gambling would have decreased further with a more extended
exposure to the task.
EXPERIMENTS
The use of a participant stake prior to gambling sessions has been commonplace
in studies on decision-making and gambling (e.g. Lichtenstein, 1965; Preston & Barrata,
1948; Schreiber & Dixon, 2001). In studies in which losses are possible, participants are
typically staked with tokens that are later exchangeable for some commodity (usually
money), although in some studies participants are staked with valueless tokens (see
Weatherly & Phelps, 2006). Concerns have been raised about the effects of the
participant stake because, as discussed above, studies on decision-making have found
that choices tend to be more risk prone when participants were staked with the
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experimenters' money compared to when they gambled with their own money
(Ladouceur et al., 1991; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). If it is assumed that people will
generally show less risk taking as the reinforcing value of the wagered commodity
increases, these findings suggest that the source of the stake may be a motivating
operation affecting the reinforcing value of the wagered commodity (Laraway,
Syncerski, Michael, & Poling, 2003; Michael, 1982).
Still other studies have found that procedural aspects of the participant stake
also influences risk taking, even when the experimenter provides the commodity.
Weatherly et al. (2006) conducted a study in which participants gambled on a simulated
slot machine with points exchangeable for money following their participation. In first
experiment, gambling was studied under three conditions in which participants were
given different instructions. The first condition modeled typical participant-stake
procedures. Participants were told that once the session began they would have 100
points that were worth $10 ($0.10 each) with which they could gamble. In two other
conditions, participants were instructed that the experimenter was giving them $10
with which they could buy tokens that could be gambled during the session. In one of
these conditions, the experimenter held a $10 bill while reading the instructions and in
the other, the participant was allowed to hold the bill during the instructions. Gambling
in this last condition perhaps best resembles conditions found in real-world gambling.
Gambling was significantly lower than in this third condition. These findings suggested
that risk taking varied systematically with the procedures used to provide participants a
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commodity with which to gamble. As the value of the commodity increased, risk taking
decreased.
Research in which participants gamble their own money may be the most valid
model of real-world gambling. However, the ethical and legal concerns with allowing
participants to lose their own money during participation makes this approach
unsuitable for most researchers (see Weatherly et al., 2006). An alternative to letting
participants gamble with their own money is to allow participants to gamble with
money they have earned during a session. Many studies have shown that losing money
that was earned during an experiment serves an aversive stimulus function (e.g., Pietras,
Brandt, & Searcy, 2010). Therefore, an alternative to staking participants with tokens
may be to require the participants to earn tokens within a session. As mentioned above,
one advantage of the gamble token-production procedure is that it makes an initial
participant stake unnecessary because tokens can be earned within a gambling session
by choosing the no-gamble option.
Experiment 3 aimed to compare gambling when tokens were staked prior to a
session to gambling when tokens were earned via the token-production option during a
session. Two Participant Stake conditions were investigated. In the Stake condition,
participants received tokens prior to each session (this condition modeled the typical
participant-stake procedure used in past experiments) and in the Earn condition, they
did not receive tokens prior to the session and were required to earn tokens during each
session. It was hypothesized that preference for the gamble option (i.e., risk taking)
would be greater in the Stake than in the Earn condition.
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In Experiment 2, there was little difference in gambling as the value of the tokenproduction schedule was manipulated from one to three tokens. A second aim of
Experiment 3 was to further explore the effects on gambling of the magnitude of
reinforcement on the token-production option varied. Thus, two token-production
conditions, TP1 and TP3, were investigated to test the reliability of findings of
Experiment 2 findings. The effects were tested between, rather than within groups of
participants.
Method
Participants. Participants were 29 students (14 females, 15 males) aged 18-22 (A/7
= 18.8 years). Participants were given identical incentives as participants in Experiment
1.
Setting and apparatus. The setting and apparatus was identical to Experiment 1.
Experimental design. A 2 (Participant Stake) X 2 (Token Production) mixed-model
design was used to investigate the within-subject effects of Participant Stake (Earn and
Stake) and the between-subjects effects of token production (TP) magnitude (TP1 or
TP3) on preference for the gamble option. Participants were randomly assigned to one
TP condition and to one Participant Stake condition order. Participants received
individual exposure to one TP condition and to each Participant Stake condition across
two consecutive 25-min sessions (separated by a 5-min break).
Procedure. In all conditions, participants were given a choice between a gamble
and a token-production option. All aspects of the procedures were identical to TP1 and
TP3 conditions in Experiment 2, with the following exceptions. First, participants were

66

given a single demonstration of each response option and were read the following
instructions prior to the first session:
For this task, you will be repeatedly choosing between two options. One option
will produce the same number of tokens each time you choose it. The other
option can produce 3, 7, or 50 tokens, but can also result in the loss of a token.
Choosing this option (the experimenter pointed to the no-gamble option) will
always produce the number of tokens indicated on the card. You may choose
this option on any trial. When you choose this option (the experimenter pointed
to the gamble option), I will remove one of your tokens and place it on the card
in front of the marker. I will then turn over the remaining three cards. If those
three cards match any of the combinations on the payout table, you will receive
the number of tokens indicated. Do you have any questions?
Second, participants were given no tokens prior to Earn sessions. Because participants
were required to have at least one token in order to select the gamble option,
participants' first response was always to the token-production option during Earn
sessions. Following this forced response, Earn sessions consisted of 30 choice trials.
However, during these 30 trials, it was possible that participants could have zero tokens
on any given trial (because of losses experienced on the gamble option) and in these
situations, the participant was again required to select the token-production option.
Because these were forced-choice trials, they were not included in any performance
measures reported below. The main dependent measure, then, was the number of
choices for the gambling option per opportunity. As in Experiment 2, participants were
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given 30 tokens prior to Stake sessions and those sessions always consisted of 30 freechoice trials.
Results
Figure 12 shows the mean proportion of choices for the gamble option per
choice opportunity across the TP and Participant Stake conditions. The horizontal
dashed line at .5 indicates the indifference point, or the point at which both options
were equally preferred. This figure indicates that participants' preference for the
gamble option in the TPl-Earn [M = 0.307, SD = 0.165) condition was slightly more risk
averse than preference in the TPl-Stake (M = 0.435, SD = 0.257), TP3-Earn [M = 0.478,
SD = 0.285), and TP3-Stake [M = 0.500, SD = 0.336) conditions. The results of a
Participant Stake (Stake and Earn) by TP (TP1 and TP3) mixed-model ANOVA indicated
no significant main effect of Participant Stake, F(l,27) = 2.164, p = 0.153, Token
Production, F(l,27) = 1.860, p = 0.184, or Participant Stake by Token Production
interaction, F(l,27) = 1.089, p = 0.306, on preference for the gamble option.
Figure 13 shows the mean experienced percent payback on the gamble option.
Mean PP was somewhat lower in the Stake (TPl-Stake M = 72.09%, SD = 45.90; TP3Stake M = 75.57%, SD = 72.43) than in the Earn (TPl-Earn M = 95.13%, SD = 75.51; TP3Earn M = 88.40%, SD = 59.88) conditions. Figure 14 shows the mean number of tokens
earned on the token-production option and participants' token total at the end of a
session. As expected, there was a similar pattern between TP1 and TP3 conditions, as
was seen in Experiment 2. That is, accumulated tokens increased with increased TP
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values. Similarly, the amounts of accumulated tokens were greater in Stake compared to
Earn conditions as a result of the 30 token stake.
To test for possible sequence effects, the data were organized by session and
Participant Stake condition order. Data from both TP 1 and 3 groups were combined
(participants received the same TP value during both sessions). Figure 15 shows for all
participants the mean proportion of gambles per choice opportunity across Sessions 1
and 2 for those participants receiving Earn-Stake or Stake-Earn condition orders and the
horizontal dashed line indicates the indifference point. This figure shows that
preference for the gamble option was lower in participants give the Earn-Stake
condition order, compared to participants given the Stake-Earn condition order, and
that preference for the gamble option was lower in Session 2 than Session 1. For
participants in the Stake-Earn condition order, preference for the gamble option was
not only much greater in Session 1 {M = 0.636, SD = 0.278) than Session 2 (M = 0.436, SD
= 0.292) but was also much greater than preference for the gamble option among
participants in the Earn-Stake condition order in both Sessions 1 (M = 0.352, SD = 0.188)
and Session 2 [M = 0.290, SD = 0.201). A session (Session 1 and Session 2) by condition
order (Earn-Stake and Stake-Earn) mixed-model ANOVA indicated a significant effect of
session, F(l,27) = 8.320, p = 0.008, and condition order, F(l,27) = 7.352, p = 0.012, on
preference for the gamble option. The session by condition order interaction was not
significant, F(l,27) = 2.280, p = 0.143. Bonferroni contrasts on all pairwise comparisons
(based on the most conservative estimate of the critical tB(6,13) = 3.107) indicated that
preference for the gamble option in Session 1 for participants in the Stake-Earn
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condition order was significantly greater than their preference in Session 2, tB = 3.16,
and greater than preference in participants in the Earn-Stake condition order during
both Session 1, tB = 4.40, and Session 2, tB = 5.37. All other contrasts were
nonsignificant.
One problem in interpreting the interaction effect is that the ANOVA and posthoc analyses on Session lead to contradictory findings. The problem stems from the
finding that preference from Session 1 to Session 2 significantly decreased for the StakeEarn condition order, but not for the Earn-Stake condition order. This implies an
interaction between these variables, but the interaction in the ANOVA was not
significant. To show these patterns more clearly, Figure 16 shows for each participant
the proportion of gambles per choice opportunity across Sessions 1 and 2 in the EarnStake and Stake-Earn condition orders, collapsed across TP value. The horizontal dashed
line indicates the indifference point. The results indicate that for most participants'
preference for the gamble option was consistently lower in the second session than the
first for both condition orders, however, the change in preference tended to be much
greater for participants in the Stake-Earn condition order.
Discussion
The present study was designed to investigate the effects of the participant
stake and TP value on gambling in a concurrent gamble token-production procedure.
There were no main effects of stake or TP value. A test on the effects of experience
(session by condition order analysis) on gambling, however, revealed a significantly
higher preference for the gamble option in participants who experienced stake
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conditions in Session 1 (Stake-Earn), as compared to preference in the same participants
during Session 2, and preference in both sessions in participants who experienced the
Earn-Stake condition. In other words, participants that received a stake during their
initial exposure to the gambling procedure showed risk proneness whereas risk aversion
was observed in all participants during all other conditions. This finding provides some
evidence that staking participants prior to experimental sessions may increase risk
taking.
It is uncertain, however, why gambling was low in the Stake condition for
participants who experienced the Earn-Stake condition order. One possible explanation
is that preference may become risk averse with repeated experience on the procedure.
This possibility is supported by the significant main effect of session on preference. That
gambling decreased with experience is consistent with the results of a prior study that
also showed a decrease in gambling on a gambling simulation across repeated
exposures to gambling conditions, albeit the decrease occurred over a much longer
exposure (see Brandt & Pietras, 2008). Experiment 2 also showed a decrease in
gambling across sessions, but the effect was most apparent from Session 2 to 3.
Overall, the finding that gambling was higher in Stake conditions for participants
who experienced Stake conditions in Session 1 is consistent with results of prior studies
showing that gambling is more likely when participants gamble with staked money than
their own money. The results therefore provide some additional evidence that gambling
procedures that stake participants with money may obtain higher levels of gambling
than procedures that allow participants to gamble with their own money.
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EXPERIMENT 4
Experiments 2 and 3 investigated the effects on gambling of the magnitude of
reinforcement on the token-production option and found little difference across two
magnitude conditions (1 vs. 3 tokens). This finding contrasts with the results of previous
studies that have shown that preference for an uncertain option varies with the
magnitude of reinforcement programmed on the certain option (e.g., Young, 1981). The
results were also inconsistent with predictions based on expected value. Experiment 4
was therefore designed to further explore the effects on gambling of the magnitude of
reinforcement on the certain option.
In Experiment 2, there was a slight decrease in gambling as the magnitude of
reinforcement on the no-gamble (token production) option increased, but the effect
was not significant. In Experiment 3, the effect of reinforcer magnitude may have been
obscured by the stake manipulations. Experiment 4 investigated the effects on gambling
of the reinforcer magnitude of the certain option when participants had to earn tokens
during a session. Gambling was investigated under three TP values (TP1, TP 2, and TP3)
using a within-subject design. The TP1 and TP3 conditions therefore systematically
replicated conditions of Experiments 2 and 3. All conditions in Experiment 4 were similar
to the Earn condition in Experiment 3. It was hypothesized that preference for the
gamble option would decrease as the token-production value increased.
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Method
Participants. Participants were 18 students (15 females, 3 males) aged 18-21 (M
= 18.6 years). Participants were given identical incentives as participants in Experiment
1.
Setting and apparatus. The setting and apparatus were identical to Experiment
1.
Experimental design. A within-subjects design was used to investigate the effects
of the Token Production (TP1, TP2, and TP3) on preference for the gambling option.
Participants received individual exposure to each TP condition once during three
consecutive 45-min sessions (separated by a 5-min break). Condition order was
randomized across participants
Procedure. All aspects of the procedures were identical to Experiment 3 Earn
conditions with the following exceptions. First, prior to the participant entering the
experimental room, the experimenter arranged the token production option by placing
an ace-card (TP1), a 2-card (TP2), or a 3-card (TP3) on the no-gamble option. Second, all
sessions consisted of 51 trials instead of 31 trials. Participants did not receive tokens
prior to any session. Therefore, all sessions required a single response to the tokenproduction option on the first trial and on any subsequent trial in which the participant
had zero tokens (data from these trials were omitted when calculating preference for
the gamble option).
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Results
Figure 17 shows the mean proportion of choices for the gamble option per
choice opportunity across all TP conditions and the horizontal dashed line indicates the
indifference point. This figure indicates that choice for the gamble option in the TP1 (M
= 0.490, SD = 0.256) and TP2 (M = 0.475, SD = 0.295) conditions was near indifferent,
but that choice was slightly risk averse in TP3 (M = 0.386, SD = 0.251). The results of a
one-way repeated-measures ANOVA showed no significant effect of TP value on
preference for the gamble option, F(2,34) = 2.038, p = 0.146. Condition order effects
were not tested due to limited data for each possible condition sequence.
Figure 18, shows each participant's preference for the gamble option across TP
conditions. This figure shows that there were substantial individual differences in risk
sensitivity, but generally supports the averaged results shown in Figure 17. That is, this
figure shows that the riskiest responding (preferences near 1) tended to occur in the
TP1 and TP2 conditions whereas the most risk averse responding (preferences near 0)
tended to occur in the TP2 and TP3 conditions.
Figure 19 shows the mean experienced percent payback, which was near the
programmed level of 104% in the TP1 condition (M = 108.36%, SD = 64.13), however, it
was considerably lower in the TP2 (M = 75.38%, SD = 29.53) and TP3 (M = 75.11%, SD =
49.60) conditions.
Figure 20 shows the mean number of tokens earned on the token-production
option and participants' token total at the end of a session. As expected, accumulated
tokens increased with increased TP values.
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Figure 21 shows the mean proportion of choices for the gamble option per
choice opportunity across sessions collapsed across TP value. This figure indicates that
preference was near indifferent in Session 1 (M = 0.51, SD - 0.26), but was slightly risk
averse in Session 2 (M = 0.43, SD = 0.25) and Session 3 (M = 0.41, SD = 0.29). Although
gambling appeared to decrease slightly across sessions, particularly form Session 1 to 2,
the results of a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that gambling did not
differ significantly across sessions, F(2,34) = 1.711, p = 0.196.
Discussion
Experiment 4 investigated the effects of TP value on gambling using a concurrent
gamble token-production procedure. As predicted, preference for the gambling option
tended to decrease slightly as the reinforcer value of the token-production option
increased, however, the effects were not statistically significant. In general, participants
showed risk indifference or risk aversion across all conditions.
That responding tended to be more risk averse than risk prone is consistent with
previous studies, which have generally shown greater preference for fixed
reinforcement amounts compared to variable amounts (see O'Daly, Case, & Fantino,
2006; Pietras & Hackenberg, 2001). However, in most previous studies preference was
assessed among fixed and variable amounts with similar means. Thus, the finding that
very few participants exclusively chose the token production option in any condition is
somewhat surprising because the mean reinforcement amount was much greater on
token-production option than on the gamble option.
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Finally, that preference tended to be slightly risk averse across TP conditions was
consistent with responding in Experiments 2 and 3. Across each of these experiments,
however, very few participants showed exclusive preference for the token-production
option, even when choices for this option produced tokens at a far greater rate (e.g.,
TP3) than choosing the gamble option. Among other possible explanations for this
finding, discussed in more detail below, is that increased token accumulation
experienced during higher TP conditions may have inadvertently increased risk
proneness.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overview
Research on behavior in situations involving uncertainty and risk have shown
that behavior is sensitive to reinforcer probability (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1984;
Mazur, 1989), as well as to variability in reinforcer delay (see Mazur, 1991), and
magnitude (see Bonem & Crossman, 1988; Barnard & Brown, 1985; Kohn, Kohn, &
Staddon, 1992). Because most research on risk preferences was not designed to study
gambling per se, the contingencies that were programmed on these experimental tasks
often differed considerably from those found in real-world games of chance. Few
studies have systematically investigated how procedural variables affect risk sensitivity,
however, research on choice under uncertainty has shown that the use of real as
opposed to hypothetical outcomes (Slovic, 1969a; Weber, et al., 2004), the nature of the
commodity wagered (Ladouceur et al., 1991; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Weatherly et al.,
2006; Weber & Zuchel, 2005), the variability of the outcomes produced (see O'Daly et
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al., 2006), the number of response options are available (see Catania, 1963), and the
amount of experience with the available options (see Barron & Erev, 2003; Garling &
Romanus, 1997; Hertwig, et al. 2004; Keren & Wagenaar, 1987; Lopes, 1981; Weber, et
al., 2004; Wedell & Bockenholt, 1990) all influence risk preferences.
Recently, operant psychologists have developed simulated-gambling procedures
designed to mimic many important characteristics of real-world games of chance (Dixon
et al., 2006; Haw, 2008; MacLin et al. 2007; Weatherly et al., 2006; Weatherly & Phelps,
2006). For instance, participants are typically given repeated experience with multioutcome gambles and participants wager real commodities. Although these
experimental tasks might better simulate games of chance, important differences
remain. For example, the gambling simulations typically provide limited response
options and rely on participant stake procedures. One goal of the present research was
to investigate whether these procedural variables affect gambling.
In the present research, gambling under standard simulated-gambling conditions
was compared to gambling under conditions that were designed to better approximate
real-world gambling contingencies. Under standard conditions, gambling was measured
when a gamble was the only available response option and a stake was given to
participants. In other conditions, gambling was measured when participants could
choose between a gamble option and a no-gamble option that produced tokens
(reinforcers) and participants were required to earn tokens to gamble with (i.e.,
participants were not provided with a stake). Overall, the findings showed that risk
taking tended to be greatest under standard procedures.
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Single- and Concurrent-Option Procedures
Experiments 1 and 2 investigated whether the availability of an alternative, nogamble option influenced levels of gambling. In standard laboratory gambling
procedures, participants can either gamble or quit the session. In real-world games of
chance, a gambler can intersperse non-gambling responses with gambling without
permanently removing themselves from the gambling environment (see Dixon et al.,
2006). In Experiment 1, gambling was investigated when only one response option was
available (participants could either gamble or quit the session), and when two response
options were available (participants could either gamble on a trial or pass and progress
to the next trial). Levels of gambling were similar across conditions, but participants
tended to make a non-gambling response sooner when they could choose a pass option.
In Experiment 2, gambling was compared across conditions when (a) only the gambling
response option was available, and (b) a gambling and a no-gamble token production
option were concurrently available. Responding on the no-gamble option produced
tokens with certainty. The amount of tokens produced by the no-gamble option varied
across conditions and was either 1 or 3. Experiment 2 showed that gambling levels were
lower in the two-option conditions, but that there were little differences across the two
token-value conditions. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that multiple-option
conditions produce lower levels of gambling than single-option conditions, but that the
difference in gambling is greatest when the no-gamble option also produces
reinforcement.
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It is possible that gambling was lower in Experiment 2 when a second option was
available not because the no-gamble option produced reinforcement with certainty but
because the no-gamble option produced a higher expected value than the gamble
option. Only in Experiment 1 was the EV similar across the two options (the gambling
option EV = 0.04 tokens and a pass no reinforcement, EV = 0 tokens). In Experiment 2,
the EV on the no-gamble option was 1 or 3 and was therefore much higher than that
produced on the no-gamble option. Participants may have gambled less during the
concurrent-conditions because choosing the no-gamble option maximized
reinforcement. Such a finding is consistent with the results of many studies that have
shown that EVcan influence risky choice (see Karen & Wagenaar, 1987). To further
explore this possibility, additional studies could investigate gambling when the EVof the
gamble option was increased to match the EVof the token-production option. Such a
manipulation would better separate the effects on preference of reinforcer variability
and EV. Increasing the EV of the gamble much over 0 tokens, however, would make the
gamble unlike most real-world games of chance. It is interesting to note that preference
for the token-production option did not significantly increase as the EV of this option
increased. This suggests that EV alone may not be responsible for the lower levels of
gambling under concurrent conditions.
That gambling differed across single- and multiple-option conditions in
Experiment 2 is in accord with prior gambling research showing that the effects of
environmental variables on gambling differ depending on whether a single or
concurrent procedure is used. For instance, both Brandt and Pietras (2008) and Dixon et
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al. (2006) investigated the effects of win frequency and size on gambling using a single
or concurrent slot-machine simulation, respectively. In both studies, it was predicted
that participants would prefer options delivering small frequent wins over options that
delivered infrequent but larger wins. Brandt and Pietras, who used the single-option
procedure, found that rates of gambling in only one of three participants were higher in
the small frequent win condition than in the large, infrequent win condition.
Alternatively, using a concurrent-gambles procedure, Dixon et al. found a reliable
preference for the slot machine that produced small, frequent wins over the slot
machine that produced large, infrequent wins. Such findings suggest that single-option
procedures do not provide as sensitive of a measure of the effects of win frequency and
size on behavior as concurrent procedures.
Similarly, single and concurrent slot-machine simulations have been used to
investigate whether behavior is sensitivity to changes in the PP of gambles. Several
studies (Brandt & Pietras, 2008; Schreiber & Dixon, 2001; Weatherly & Brandt, 2004)
using a single slot-machine simulation have showed that gambling does not vary
systematically across a range of PP values. However, a recent study by Haw (2008)
showed that when participants were given a choice between slot machines that differed
in PP, some participants showed a preference for the slot machine that produced the
highest PP. Because prior research with humans has shown that subjects typically prefer
an option when it has a greater EV relative to other options and when repeated choices
can be made (Karen & Wagenaar, 1987), these findings suggest that single-option
procedures also do not provide an adequate measure of sensitivity to PP.
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As these two examples illustrate, the concurrent gambles procedure appears to
provide a better test of sensitivity of gambling to environmental variables (a similar
pattern has emerged among investigations of reinforcement magnitude, see Bonem &
Crossman, 1988). The present research, however, is the first study to directly compare
gambling levels across conditions that provide only a single response option to
conditions that provide concurrent response options. It is important to note however,
that unlike prior studies, in the present research a concurrent gamble no-gamble
procedure was used rather than a concurrent-gambles procedure. Whether a similar
pattern will be found if variables such as win size and rate or PP were manipulated
within the concurrent gamble no-gamble procedure therefore remains to be
investigated.
As discussed above, one possibility for the different patterns of responding
across single and concurrent procedures shown in Experiment 2 is that the concurrent
no-gamble option reduced the experimental demands for gambling. However, even
under concurrent conditions gambling occurred at non-zero levels. It is possible, then,
that experimenter demand still affected performance. Although a non-gambling option
was available, participants were told in the instructions that they would be presented
with a gambling option. If in fact participants behavior was influenced by the knowledge
that they were participating in a gambling study, greater risk taking would be the
expected performance (see Navarick, 2007). Future studies could compare gambling in
participants when they were or were not given instructions containing the world
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gambling. Such studies could provide additional information about the role of demand
on gambling in the concurrent task.
Although the type of options programmed on the concurrent gamble no-gamble
procedure were designed to better approximate gambling under naturalistic conditions,
the present experiments were not designed to directly test the ecological validity of the
results. Therefore, it remains uncertain how well the procedure actually models realworld gambling. To address this research question directly, comparisons of gambling
under laboratory conditions and in real gambling environments would be needed. Such
comparisons are difficult to conduct, however, given the practical difficulties and ethical
issues involved in studying gambling outside the laboratory. In fact, only a few studies
have attempted such comparisons (Andreson & Brown, 1984; Dickerson, 1979;
Ladouceur et al., 1991) and none of those studies were conducted in the U.S.
The no-gamble option arranged in the present study yielded the same reinforcer
as the gamble option: generalized conditioned reinforcers or tokens. Arranging two
options that produced tokens may simulate choices between working for money and
gambling for money, but it does not closely model choice options available in a casino.
In a casino, non-gambling behaviors are more likely to consist of activities such as social
interaction, observing others, eating, drinking, or smoking. These activities do not
necessarily produce reinforcement on a predictable schedule and the reinforcers are
very different from those produced by games of chance. Analyzing the effects on
gambling of the availability of other types of reinforcers may therefore be a fruitful area
of future research. For example, identifying reinforcers that effectively compete with
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reinforcers provided by gambling (e.g., social reinforcers) may lead to the development
of new methods for reducing gambling. On the other hand, some reinforcers may
function as complementary reinforcers that may increase the reinforcing value of
gambling. For instance nicotine appears to produce greater discounting of delayed
outcomes (Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999), which may reduce participants' risksensitivity during a gambling procedure (Rachlin, 1990).
Finally, the concurrent gamble no-gamble task may be improved upon by adding
another gamble option. Such a procedure would be designed as a three-option task in
which one option was a token-production option, and the second and third options
were both gambles. This procedure would have the same benefits as the gamble nogamble procedure, that is, it would eliminate the need for a participant stake and
eliminate the requirement to gamble (i.e., reduce possible experimental demands for
gambling), and it would allow preference to be assessed between concurrent gamble
options within a single session. As indicated above, arranging concurrent-gamble
options appeared to generate gambling sensitivity to certain environmental variables
(e.g., percentage payback and win probability and size) whereas a similar sensitivity was
not produced on a single-option procedure investigating the same variables.
Staked and Earned Commodities
During laboratory experiments on gambling, participants must possess some
commodity in order to wager, thus, a participant-stake procedure is typically used.
Studies have shown, however, that the magnitude of the stake (Weatherly & Brandt,
2004), its source (Ladouceur et al., 1991; Thaler & Johnson, 1990), and procedures used
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deliver a participant (Weatherly et al., 2006) influence risk taking. In each case, risktaking was lowest when the conditions most closely mimicked those found in real-world
gambling. This suggests that standard-laboratory participant-stake procedures may
generate artificially high levels of risk-taking.
Experiment 3 was therefore designed to investigate gambling when participants
were or were not given a stake. One goal of this procedure was to determine whether
the concurrent-gamble no gamble procedure could eliminate the need for using a stake.
In the Stake condition, participants received tokens exchangeable for entries into a $50
lottery prior to sessions. In the Earn conditions, participants started each session with
zero tokens, but tokens could be earned with certainty during the session by selecting
the token-production option (tokens could also be earned probabilistically on the
gamble option). Experiment 3 showed that preference for the gamble option was
greater in the Stake than Earn conditions, but only when the Stake condition was
experienced first. That gambling was initially high with tokens staked prior to the
session suggests that those tokens were less valuable to the participant than tokens
obtained during later conditions in which they had to be earned first. This possibility is
consistent with studies showing that increasing the value of money reduces gambling
(see Weatherly & Brandt, 2004). In addition, it is consistent with studies with humans
(e.g., Alessandri, Darcheville, Delevoye-Turrel, & Zentall, 2008) and nonhumans
(Clements, Feltus, Kaiser, & Zentall, 2000) that have shown the work ethic effect, or the
finding that stimuli which required more work to produced may be more reinforcing
than stimuli that were easy to produce.
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It is uncertain whether a procedure, which requires participants to earn tokens
to gamble, has greater ecological validity than one that stakes participants with tokens.
However, it is noteworthy that one of the few studies in which the ecological validity of
laboratory-gambling procedures was investigated (Ladouceur et al., 1991) found that
gambling levels were lower when participants risked their own money in a naturalistic
setting than when money was provided by the experimenter during similar conditions in
a laboratory setting. That gambling was greater in the laboratory when money was
staked is comparable to the findings of the present research. The present studies,
together with Ladouceur et al. (1991), therefore suggest that money earned during a
gambling session may be as valuable to participants as money acquired prior to
participation. This possibility suggests experimental gambling tasks that use participant
stakes may generate high levels of risk taking and that procedures in which participants
must earn tokens during a session may reduce this problem, which makes it more
similar to the gambling conditions found in the natural environment. In other words,
when gambling with earned tokens rather than staked tokens is arranged in the
laboratory, the results may have more ecological validity.
Token-Production Schedule
As discussed above, one goal of the present research was to investigate
gambling when an alternative, no-gamble option was available. It was assumed that the
reinforcer magnitude on the no-gamble option would affect gambling, but the extent to
which it would affect gambling was unknown. Therefore, in Experiments 2, 3, and 4,
gambling was investigated across several magnitudes of reinforcement on the no-
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gamble option. In Experiments 2 and 3 gambling was investigated when the no-gamble
option produced one or three tokens (under stake or earn conditions), and in
Experiment 4 gambling was investigated when the no-gamble option produced, one,
two, or three tokens (under earn conditions).
In Experiments 2 and 4, higher token magnitudes on the token-production
option were associated with lower levels of gambling. However, in both cases,
considerable individual differences were observed and the effects failed to reach
statistical significance. When tested between independent groups of participants in
Experiment 3, again, no significant relationship between token magnitude and gambling
was found, and in fact, preference for the gamble option tended to be slightly greater in
the larger token-magnitude condition. Together, these experiments failed to show
reliable effects on gambling of the token magnitude produced on the token-production
option.
One possible explanation for the insensitivity to reinforcer magnitude shown in
these experiments is that performance was strongly controlled by instructions.
Participants were given extensive instructions (and responses were modeled by the
experimenter) because the task was novel. The extensive instructions, however, may
have reduced the sensitivity of behavior to the reinforcer magnitude. This possibility is
supported by previous research that has shown that behavior in human participants was
more sensitive to changes in reinforcement parameters when performance was
uninstructed versus instructed (see Dixon & Hayes, 1998; Kudadjie-Gyamfi & Rachlin,
2002; Catania, Matthews, & Shimoff, 1982).
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Another possible explanation for insensitivity to reinforcer magnitude on the
certain option was that changes in token-production magnitude affected participants'
rate of token accumulation (see Figures 11,14, and 20). That is, as the token magnitude
increased so did the number of accumulated tokens. Some studies with humans (e.g.,
Pietras & Hackenberg, 2001) and nonhumans (e.g., Barnard & Brown, 1985) have shown
that risk aversion increased as reserves increased (in the present studies, reserves are
analogous to accumulated tokens). However, this type of pattern has generally been
found when participants were motivated to keep reserves above a minimum level.
Because no explicit minimum requirements were present in the current studies, the
increasing token reserves may have actually had the opposite effect on gambling:
greater reserves may have led to greater risk-taking. This possibility is supported by
Silberberg, Murray, Christensen, and Asano (1988), who showed that participants were
riskier during 10 trials of roulette play when staked with $10,000 compared to when
staked with $10 (hypothetical amounts). Although increased token-production
magnitude was hypothesized to reduce risk taking, the possible risk increasing effects of
increased reserves may have been present across conditions of increased token
production. If so, the effects of these variables across token-production would have
affected risk in opposite directions therefore confounding the intended analysis.
Additional analyses provide further evidence that gambling may have been
influenced by accumulated tokens. A participant's tokens were always arranged in
stacks often tokens and as tokens were gained and lost, they were added and removed
from the stack of the most recently earned tokens, i.e., the last stack. Although it was
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clear across the experiments that responding did not tend to vary with the total number
of accumulated tokens, casual observation suggested that gambling was more likely
when the last stack was incomplete (1-9 tokens) compared to when it was complete (10
tokens), in other words, gambling appeared to be less likely when a wager made the last
stack change from complete to incomplete. To examine this possibility more
systematically, trial-by-trial analyses were conducted on participants' choices in
Experiment 4 to determine the probability of a gamble response in the presence of each
last-stack value (1-10) for all participants. Data were examined in Experiment 4 because
only magnitude was manipulated in that experiment. Both visual and inferential
statistical analyses of these data indicated a significant shift in responding as a function
of token stack: choice was more risk averse when the last stack was complete (M = 0.34,
SD = 0.29) than when it was incomplete (M = 0.45, SD = 0.26) (see Figure 22).
It is unclear why the number of accumulated tokens in a stack influenced
gambling. Because the outcomes of the gamble were random, certain stack values
should not have been associated with any particular outcome, thus it is unlikely that this
value served a discriminative function. A more likely possibility is that this value
occasioned verbal responses that influenced gambling. Prior studies have shown, for
example, that participants self-reported gambling strategies are often related to token
reserves, or the number of accumulated tokens (see Brandt & Pietras, 2008). Brandt and
Pietras had participants play a computerized single-option slot-machine simulation with
points exchangeable for money across many sessions. They showed that gambling in 4
of 6 participants appeared to be influenced by their self-generated gambling strategies.

88

This conclusion was based on self-reported records of the participants' strategies
collected at the end of the experiment as well as from performance on the gamble task.
The findings suggested that sometime during their participation, participants
established an earnings target, or a minimum number of points with which they would
be willing to end a session. For instance, participants always started a session with 50
points and in one participant, the reported earnings target was 40 points. Across 39
sessions, only twice did this participant end a session with fewer than 40 points. In the
current study, participants had actual tokens (i.e., poker chips) stacked in from of them
rather than points on a computer monitor, however, the change in risk from complete
to incomplete stack values may have been affected by a self-generated rule similar to
the earnings targets reported in Brandt and Pietras. Thus, it appears from the last-stack
analysis that even seemingly innocuous procedural variables, such as how the tokens
are arranged for participants, may actually alter within session sensitivity to risk and
therefore may be important for understanding risk sensitivity.
It is also interesting to note that across all studies, gambling occurred more often
than would have been expected given the EVof the gamble and token-production
options. Previous studies have generally shown that participants prefer certain gains to
probabilistic gains with similar or even greater average means (see Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). However, the gamble option in the present studies had a far lower mean
return than the certain gain. The gamble option EV = 0.04 tokens, thus wagering on this
option produced minimal reinforcement on average (just slightly more than breaking
even). Responses on the token-production option, however, generated tokens with
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certainty, thus the EV of this option was equal to the number of tokens produced. The
EVof the token-production option was therefore always greater than the EVof the
gamble option. It was possible for the obtained EVto differ from the programmed EV,
however, the mean experienced EVdid not exceeded zero in most TP conditions (see
Figures 10,13, and 19). Despite this, in many cases participants gambled on over half of
the trials. The amount of risk-taking in these studies was relatively high considering the
low EV of the gamble. Thus, it is possible that there was little effect on gambling of the
magnitude of reinforcement on the certain option because choice was strongly risk
prone.
To the experimenter's knowledge, no prior study has shown such strong risk
proneness when participants were given a choice between a certain gain and risky
option with zero expected value. One variable that may have generated the high levels
of risk taking is that participants were told that a very large win (i.e., three jokers) was
possible. Participants were instructed that a large win was possible because it was
assumed that very little gambling would occur if a certain token-production option was
concurrently available. Providing instructions to participants that a very large win was
possible (although in actuality it was not), however, made the gamble option appear
more valuable than it actually was. Future studies could investigate the effects of the
presence of such a large win on gambling (for a discussion on the effects of large wins
that are actually delivered, see, Kassinove & Schare, 2001).
Finally, it may have been possible that greater sensitivity to the EV among the
options would have been observed given greater experience with the gambling
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procedure, that is, gambling may have decreased further given greater experience with
the discrepant EVs between the token-production and gamble options. Evidence from
past studies indicated that strong risk aversion to a gamble with a negative average EV
was only observed following considerable experience, often several hours, with the
procedure (Brandt & Pietras, 2008). Although the programmed EVof the gamble option
in the present study was 0.04, the mean experienced EV tended to be less than zero,
therefore, similarly high levels of experience may have been necessary to generate
strong risk aversion in the present studies.
Summary
Common laboratory-gambling simulations have features that may generate
higher levels of risk taking than would occur under settings that are more naturalistic.
Specifically, gambling simulations commonly provide participants with only a single
reinforced response option and arrange for participants to gamble with experimenterprovided money. The present research investigated whether these methodological
features influenced gambling and found that gambling levels were higher when a singlereinforced option was present compared to when multiple options were present, and
that gambling levels were higher when participants gambled with staked money
compared to earned money, although the effects in the latter case were dependent on
condition sequence. The results suggested that a concurrent gamble token-production
procedure that arranges multiple response options and that arranges for participants to
gamble with earned money may provide a better laboratory-gambling simulation than
existing procedures. Overall, this research indicates that methodological features of

91

common gambling simulations affect risk taking and that continued research and
development of gambling procedures is needed. Such research may lead not only to the
development of better methods for studying gambling, including methods that have
better ecological validity, but may also help identify new variables that affect gambling.
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Figure 1. Gamble-option payout table.
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Figure 2. The game table used in all experimental conditions. The participant and
experimenter were seated at opposite sides of the table fat the bottom and top of the
picture, respectively).
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Figure 3. Mean number of gambles placed in the Quit and Pass conditions of Experiment
1 (error bars indicate the standard error of the mean).
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Figure 4. Mean experienced percentage payback in the Quit and Pass conditions of
Experiment 1.
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Figure 5. Mean number of tokens remaining at the end of a session in the Quit and Pass
conditions of Experiment 1 (error bars indicate the standard error of the mean).
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Figure 6. Mean number of consecutive gambles that occurred prior to a single quit or
pass response in the Quit and Pass conditions of Experiment 1.
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Figure 7. Mean number of gambles placed in the Quit and Pass conditions across
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Figure 9. Number of gambles placed by each participant in the Quit and Token
Production conditions of Experiment 2.
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Figure 10. Mean experienced percentage payback in the Quit and Token Production
conditions of Experiment 2.
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Figure 11. Mean number of tokens earned on the token-production option (choices
only) and the mean remaining tokens at the end of a session in the Quit and Token
Production conditions of Experiment 2.
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Figure 12. Mean proportion of choices for the gamble option per opportunity across
Participant Stake and Token Production conditions of Experiment 3. The horizontal
dashed line indicates the indifference point.
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Figure 13. Mean experienced percentage payback in the Participant Stake and Token
Production conditions of Experiment 3.
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Figure 14. Mean number of tokens earned on the token-production option (from free
choices only) and the mean remaining tokens at the end of a session in all conditions of
Experiment 3.
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Figure 16. Proportion of choices for the gamble option per opportunity for each
participant across Sessions 1 and 2 of the Stake-Earn and Earn-Stake condition orders in
Experiment 3. The horizontal dashed line indicates the indifference point.
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Token Production conditions in Experiment 4. The horizontal dashed line indicates the
indifference point.
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Figure 18. Proportion of choices for the gamble option per opportunity for each
participant across Token Production conditions in Experiment 4. The horizontal dashed
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Figure 20. Mean number of tokens earned on the token-production option (choices
only) and the mean remaining tokens at the end of a session in the Token Production
conditions of Experiment 4.
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Figure 21. Mean proportion of choices for the gamble option in Sessions 1, 2, and 3 of
Experiment 4. The horizontal dashed line indicates the indifference point.
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